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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL 
DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC 
The life insurance industry provides the means through 
which individuals and families offer financial protection to 
their dependents in case of the death of the policyholder. 
The industry also provides a channel through which individuals 
can save some of their surplus funds to provide for retirement 
and contingencies. 
As financial intermediaries, life insurance companies 
help reduce the cost of capital. Because of the vast sums 
of funds they work with, they can reduce substantially the 
per unit cost of gathering and analyzing information on 
available direct securities by equipping and maintaining a 
staff of specialists that concerns itself with nothing but 
this aspect of their operations. Also, because of the large 
pool of funds at their command, they can reduce the per unit 
cost of transactions — the cost of buying, holding and 
selling securities. This is so because they can spread costs 
over a larger volume of assets than can most individuals. 
For most individuals, the safety of their principal can be 
greatly enhanced if they can hold a variety of direct secur­
ities whose prices do not all move in a parallel way. They 
can reduce default risk by holding a variety of debt, claims 
and ownership claims against several debtors. However, most 
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individuals simply do not have the large amounts of funds or 
expertise it would take to achieve the cost savings or ef­
fective diversification of their assets. 
Also, it would be time consuming, inefficient and 
costly if such deficit units as large corporations that need 
vast sums of funds to finance their operations had to deal 
with millions of individuals each with only a small amount of 
funds to invest in any one period. 
Thus, life insurance companies, along with other fi­
nancial intermediaries, help bring together the surplus and 
deficit units or savers and dissavers in the economy. This 
helps maintain and promote a smooth and orderly functioning of 
the credit and capital market. Because they operate with vast 
sums of money, they can buy and hold a large number of dif­
ferent securities. They can buy each security in lots large 
enough to achieve lower transactions costs. Through expert 
management, they can diversify their assets in ways that would 
eliminate risk to a degree that would not be possible for most 
individuals who only have small sums of money to work with. 
The objective of this study, is to isolate those primary 
factors that influence life insurance companies in their 
allocation of funds among the various competing assets and also 
to determine,in a limited way, the impact of monetary policy on 
the portfolio decisions of life insurance companies. 
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In general, it could be argued that the efficiency of the 
financial sector of the economy would have some influence on 
the savings-versus-consumption decisions of the public. It 
is thus of interest to try to shed some light on capital 
allocation by life insurance companies and the impact monetary 
policy has on this allocative process. 
If monetary policy is to serve as an effective stabiliza­
tion tool, different securities in the portfolios of life 
insurance companies and other financial intermediaries would be 
expected to be good substitutes for one another. For instance, 
if the Federal Reserve System (Fed) is pursuing a tight monetary 
policy by selling government securities in the open market, one 
can argue that this policy would not be a very effective 
stabilizing tool, unless government bonds and corporate bonds, 
as an example, are substitutes for one another in the port­
folio. 
Assuming rational economic behavior, it can be argued 
that capital should flow into areas with the highest rates of 
return. If two securities are good substitutes, a small 
change in the rate of return of one, should induce an adjust­
ment in the relative quantities held of the two. For example, 
a small increase in the corporate bond rate relative to the 
mortgage rate should attract funds toward corporate bonds and 
corporate investments and away from mortgage lending and home 
building. If the two securities are poor substitutes or 
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independent, then it might take huge shifts in the rates of 
return to induce a desired flow of funds in the capital market. 
This implies inefficiency of the capital markets to allocate 
funds effectively and would impede the effectiveness of 
monetary policy as a stabilization tool. 
Sources and Uses of Funds by Life 
Insurance Companies 
Life insurance companies' funds are derived from three 
main sources (Life Insurance Association of America, 1962); 
new money derived from net savings by policyholders in life 
insurance companies; return flow from invested funds, which 
arises from amortization, maturities and other repayments of 
bonds and mortgages; outright sales of long-term assets 
from the portfolio or drawing down of cash and short-term 
security holdings. 
Savings though life insurance companies differ funda^ 
mentally from savings through such deposit-type institutions 
as mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations 
in at least three important aspects (Life Insurance Associa­
tion of America, 1962, pp. 8-9); 
1. Life insurance savings are long-term and contractual 
in nature and therefore are more stable. 
2. They are motivated primarily by the desire for family 
financial protection in the event of death. 
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3. They are ordinarily expected to be left intact 
until the death of the insured rather than with­
drawn for some consumer expenditure. 
Investment Trend 
The long-term nature of life insurance contracts has led 
to preferred investments by life insurance companies largely 
in long-term fixed-income assets. This means that reserves 
have been placed primarily in investments bearing a fixed 
rate of return, regular payments of interest over the life of 
the loan, and scheduled repayment in a fixed number of dollars. 
This would provide a characteristic of stability over time 
paralleling the contractual obligations of life insurance 
companies to policyholders. Investments primarily in longs, 
also would avoid added transactions costs of reinvestments that 
would arise from investing in shorts and would avoid volatility 
and instability associated with shorter-term securities' rates. 
Specifically, life insurance companies' reserves have 
been placed primarily in the following assets; mortgages, 
corporate bonds, and U.S. government securities. Other 
assets in their portfolios include stocks, real estate, and 
state, local, and foreign government securities. 
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Factors Governing Investment Policies 
We assume that life insurance companies as an industry, 
are profit maximizers, that is, they strive for the highest 
possible rates of return. There are some constraints, however, 
foremost among which is the risk involved with holding each 
class of securities. 
In addition to the strictly financial and economic moti­
vation of profit, there also may be a public interest aspect 
to the investment policies of life insurance companies. By 
this is meant that the companies might wish to project the 
image of a good corporate citizen and portray themselves as 
serving the direct and immediate needs and interests of their 
policyholders by engaging in residential mortgage lending, 
housing projects and small business loans, even when these may 
not be the most profitable outlets for their funds. They 
also may buy an unusual quantity of government bonds during 
war times, for instance, as a patriotic gesture. 
There is also the need to maintain a desired liquidity 
level by the companies. This need might be for an operating 
balance of cash and bank deposits, to guard against the possi­
bility of unforeseen contingencies that might increase death 
benefits, for example, wars or epidemics; or also to remain 
sufficiently flexible to take advantage of worthwhile invest­
ment opportunities that may arise. 
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There are several statutory limitations on the investment 
policies of life insurance companies, and also regulations 
governing valuations of securities. These regulations vary 
from state to state. They are designed presumably to insure 
the diversification of life insurance company portfolios. 
Essentially, they require that investments in different areas 
meet certain criteria. For a detailed discussion of these 
regulations, see Life Insurance Association of America (1962). 
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CHAPTER II. A REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES 
The literature on portfolio selection is voluminous. 
Surprisingly though, studies on the portfolio behavior of 
life insurance companies or specifically studies on the factors 
determining portfolio choice by life insurance companies are 
almost nonexistent. This, despite the fact that life insurance 
companies are one of the largest financial intermediaries in 
terms of total assets. 
The lack of studies on portfolio management by life in­
surance companies may be a result of the fact that the life 
insurance industry is highly regulated. The regulations vary 
from state to state and cover such areas as what assets may 
be held in the portfolio, and what percentage of the port­
folio may be devoted to some of the assets. Thus, it might 
appear on the surface, given the myriad of regulations, that 
life insurance companies are virtually "locked in" in terms 
of what they can or cannot do, and that their portfolio be­
havior is determined just as much, if not more, by such 
institutional factors as regulations and changes in tax laws 
as by market returns on the various assets they hold in their 
portfolios. 
Kenneth Kleefeld in a study of the postwar demand for 
financial assets, (Special Stuf "-es Paper, Number 33, July 
17, 1973), included life insurance companies as one of the 
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investor classes he studied. His study, however, focussed 
on whether households and institutional investors reacted 
similarly to changes in market yields on time deposits, 
bonds and equities. He specified an aggregative model which 
determined endogenously the asset demand of the various in­
vestor classes as separate aggregates. 
Kleefeld started with an investor's utility function, 
which is exponential in portfolio income during the invest­
ment period: 
U(Tr) = e-b". (2.1) 
where 
TT = portfolio income, and 
b = investor's coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Assuming that the rates of return on n alternative assets 
have a multivariate normal distribution, with a mean vector 
r and covariance matrix S, he asserted, without showing how, 
that maximizing expected utility would yield the following 
vector of "optimal" asset holdings: 
A = -WH + (l/b)Gr, (2,2) 
where 
A = n-order column vector of optimal asset holdings, 
n 
W = investor's total assets { = E A.} 
i=l 1 
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G = S rr ~ symmetric matrix of asset rate of 
i'S i return coefficients. 
H 
and 
i = n-order column vector of ones. 
By assuming that the utility function is exponential 
in the portfolio rate of return, tt/W, and substituting b/W 
for b in A = -WH + (l/b)Gr, we get 
Equation (2.4) implies the demand equation for each asset 
is homogenous of degree one in total assets and linear in 
asset rates of return. 
In his estimated model, the expected nominal rates of 
return on the nonmonetary assets and investor class holdings 
of each asset were determined within his model, while the 
total supply of each asset and the total assets of each in­
vestor class were exogenous. 
In the present study, rates of return will be treated as 
exogenous and life insurance companies will then be expected 
A = -WH + (W/b)Gr (2.3) 
Dividing both sides of (2,3) by W, yields 
A/W = -H + (l/b)Gr (2.4) 
11 
to react to them in terms of allocating their portfolio to the 
various assets. In this study, portfolio decision, as will 
be argued in the theory chapter, is determined by extrinsic 
asset yields and their associated risks and not by intrinsic 
qualities represented by corresponding utility function 
parameters as have been specified by Kleefeld. 
Kleefeld, perhaps, was forced to resort to the use of a 
utility function because the focus of his study was a com­
parison between consumers' and institutional investors' reac­
tions to changing yields. Consumers, it is generally argued, 
maximize utility, and for businesses, it is usually argued 
that underlying profit maximization is some utility function. 
On a priori grounds, one would question the appropriate­
ness of specifying a utility function exponential in the port­
folio rate of return and deriving the asset demand equation 
from these for an institutional investor such as life in­
surance companies. In the actual estimation of the model, 
Kleefeld did not include mortgages as an asset held by life 
insurance companies. Mortgages averaged about 32 per cent of 
total life insurance companies' portfolios during the years 
covered by his study (Life Insurance Fact Book, 1974). The 
exclusion of such a major asset, would introduce serious bias 
to his simultaneous equation system. 
In terms of empirical results, Kleefeld writes: 
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The least satisfactory model estimates were for 
the highly regulated life insurance sector, as (1) two 
of this sector's four nonmonetary asset demand equations 
have estimated own-rate coefficients which are both 
negative and significant at the .05 level in one-tailed 
tests... (Special Studies Paper, 33, p. 18). 
The negative own-rate coefficient was one problem en­
countered in some of the estimated equations in the present 
study. Although that result is corroborated by Kleefeld's 
study, one is still left somewhat amiss trying to explain it. 
Kleefeld also reported that cross-rate coefficient sym­
metry conditions did not hold in general. In other words, the 
estimated demand equation for security A may imply substitut-
ability between A and B while the estimated demand for B may 
imply complementarity between the two, A similar problem was 
encountered in the present study with respect to the rela­
tionship between the smaller assets such as state and local 
government and U.S. government bonds with the major assets 
such as bonds and mortgages. 
The negative own-rate coefficient and nonsymmetry prob­
lems appear rather pervasive in many of the recent institution­
al investor studies — and are not limited to just life 
insurance companies. 
Straszheim (1971), and Hendershott (1971) both reported 
such problems in their studies. Neither one could explain the 
cause of the problem. 
William Silber, in his study of the portfolio behavior of 
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financial institutions, used a stock adjustment formulation 
for his asset demand equations (Silber, 1970). The form of 
his estimated equations is as follows: 
- Vi' <2-5' 
where 
0<a<l; 
AXt = Xf-Xt-l' 
refers to the flow into security X during time period t; 
X^ represents the desired holdings of security X, 
and 
Xt_i is the amount of X held at the end of the last 
period. 
His general expression for X* is: 
%% = bi+bjtijI+bj+nA (2.6) 
where 
{i^} is a set of interest rates that is relevant for 
and 
^ portfolio choice, 
A is the level of assets. 
He estimated the demand for only three of the assets in 
the portfolios of life insurance companies: U.S. government 
bonds, corporate bonds and mortgages, on the rationale that 
these three were the major assets constituting more than 80 
per cent of the total portfolio. 
His hypotheses were tests of substitutability and comple­
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mentarity between pairs of the securities. The substitute-
complement relationships established by the results indicate 
that portfolio allocation by life insurance companies responds 
to interest rate changes. In estimating the demand for 
government bonds, the only interest rate variable he used 
was the own rate. Its t-value was insignificant. According 
to Silber, when other rates were included, all the t-values 
were less than .5 and some of the signs were incorrect. His 
demand equation for corporate bonds suggests they are substi­
tutes both for governments and mortgages. The mortgage de­
mand equation suggests that mortgages are substitutes for 
corporates and are complements with governments. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY PORTFOLIO SELECTION 
Securities and Attributes of Securities 
Securities,in general, have two major attributes — 
their rates of return or yields and the risk associated with 
each security. By the rate of return is meant that in each 
time period, the investor knows the current rate of return on 
each security and also has some concept of the probability 
distributions of expected rates of return over the desired 
holding period. As used in this study, security yields or 
rates of return represent the mean or expected value of the 
probability distribution of returns. The risk associated 
with holding each security will be a measure of the dispersion 
of outcomes around the expected value. When considering dif­
ferent alternatives, investors base their decisions on these 
expected returns and the risk of each security. 
The overall risk of a portfolio can be reduced through 
diversification. While diversification can reduce risk, un­
fortunately, it can not eliminate risk completely because 
security returns are highly correlated. If the investor 
could find assets whose returns are perfectly negatively 
correlated, then he could eliminate risk entirely from his 
portfolio by holding only those assets. Unfortunately, since 
all securities are subject to the same common forces, albeit 
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in varying degrees, this is seldom, if ever, possible. At the 
other extreme, if the returns on all securities of similar 
maturities were perfectly positively correlated, that is if 
the rates of returns on all securities rose and fell by the 
same proportions at the same times, then diversification 
would not reduce risk at all. However, securities' returns, 
though highly correlated, are neither perfectly positively 
nor perfectly negatively correlated. Thus, it is possible to 
reduce, to some degree, the overall risk of a portfolio 
through diversification. To achieve this, investors would 
avoid those securities whose returns are highly positively 
correlated. However, there is a trade off between risk re­
duction and yield, that is, risk reduction may be sacrificed 
to some extent under the inducement of higher yields. 
Uncertainties that Affect the Risk Rating 
of Various Securities 
There are several factors that affect the degree of risk 
associated with each security. Tobin discussed four of these 
(Tobin, 1965): 
1. Purchasing power risk — Uncertainty about the 
purchasing power of the dollar affects securities 
with fixed face value in money terms. 
2. Uncertainty about future interest rates — Capital 
gains or losses will be made on interest-bearing 
bonds depending on whether future rates fall or rise. 
17 
3. Default risk — This has to do with the ability of 
the issuing company to redeem debt claims against 
it. 
4. Profitability risk — private equities are subject 
to the specific risk of uncertainty regarding the 
earning power of a particular firm. 
A fifth risk suggested by William Silber (Silber, 1970), 
is the marketability risk. If two securities are identical in 
all respects except that one has a well-organized secondary 
market and the other has a poor secondary market, investors 
in the latter run the risk of being able to liquidate their 
security holdings only at a depressed price compared with the 
price offered for the security with the better market. 
The above risk classification can be used to analyze and 
contrast the different securities in the portfolios of life 
insurance companies. In general, securities with similar 
risks are more likely to be substitutes for each other in the 
portfolio while those with different or independent risks 
are more likely to be complements and can be used to diversify 
the portfolio. 
If the risk components of different securities compen­
sate for each other to a great extent, the diversification 
of the portfolio might actually result in a complementary 
relationship between these securities, that is, an increase 
in the yield on Security A, might increase the demand for Se­
curity B at the expense of another group of substitute assets. 
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9Qa 
Two commodities a and b are substitutes if >0, i.e. 
ceteris paribus, if an increase in price (P) of good b leads 
to an increase in the quantity demanded (Q) of good a 
(Henderson and Quandt, 1971). 
Extending this definition to the securities market and 
keeping in mind that it is the expected yield on securities 
rather than their price which makes them more or less at­
tractive to investors, two securities would be substitutes if 
3Q 
—— < 0; where r^ is the interest rate or yield on security B 
3r. b 
3Qa 
and T— > 0 implies a complementary relationship. 
Whereas consumer demand theory usually abstracts from 
the effect of expectations on the demand for different goods, 
expectations about future interest rates play an important 
role in securities demand. 
Changes in current rates of interest influence expected 
future rates, which in turn, influence the current demand for 
securities. Current yields on the various securities, how­
ever, are good proxies for their expected yields. 
We can classify the securities in the portfolios of life 
insurance companies according to maturity — the distinction 
between short-term government bonds and long-term government 
bonds or, according to issuer — the distinction between 
long-term government bonds and corporate bonds. 
Of major concern in this study will be the degree of 
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substitutability of securities classified by issuer and not 
by maturity. In other words, we are restricting the invest­
ment process by life insurance companies. This restriction 
implies that if the portfolio manager is considering invest­
ing in long-term mortgages, the alternative is not negotiable 
certificates of deposits or treasury bills, but long-term 
government bonds or long-term corporate bonds. This is not 
to deny that life insurance companies buy and hold certifi­
cates of deposits and treasury bills. Rather, the restric­
tion is meant to bypass the term structure of interest rates 
issue, since that is not the major focus of this study. One 
is fairly safe in imposing the above restriction because the 
obligations of life insurance companies are contractual in 
nature, long-term and actuarially predictable and as a re­
sult, most of their investments have traditionally been in 
long-term assets. 
We can now examine the groups of securities in life 
insurance company portfolios, classified according to issuer, 
with respect to susceptibility to the various categories of 
risk. The discussion that follows parallels what will be 
stated more formally later as part of the hypotheses that 
will be tested. 
In general, all bonds face the threat of inflation, 
whereas real assets or equity capital do not. Thus an in­
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vestor can hedge against inflation or purchasing power risk 
by holding both equities and bonds. 
Default risk differentiates between U.S. government 
securities and securities of other borrowers. This is 
because investors know the government will always meet 
its obligations to creditors. The government can always 
raise taxes or print new money to redeem its debt. This is 
not true of private debtors. 
Marketability risk — The existence of a well-organized 
secondary market is another measure of risk (Robinson, 1964). 
Robinson established U.S. government securities as having the 
best secondary market, with state-local government and corpo­
rate securities in a close tie for the next best secondary 
market and mortgages trailing. 
On the basis of the discussion of the various risks and 
how they affect the various assets, one would hypothesize that 
equity capital and bonds would lend themselves to a comple­
mentary relationship in a portfolio, given the relative 
independence of their risks. 
Mortgages, which are relatively illiquid and with a 
poor secondary market would tend to be complemehtary in a 
portfolio with government securities. Although both share 
similar risks because of inflation and the future course 
of interest rates, an increase in the yield of mortgages and 
thus the amount of mortgage holdings might lead to an increase 
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in holdings of governments to maintain a desired liquidity 
position, at the expense of a third group of securities. This 
third group might be corporate or state-local bonds, which 
have a poorer secondary market than governments but not so 
poor as mortgages. 
Mortgages would tend to be substitutes for either 
corporate or state-local government bonds, since the liquidity 
distinction does not exist between mortgages versus corpo-
rates or versus municipals as it does between governments and 
mortgages. 
Governments will most likely be substitutes for both 
state-local and corporates. All three share purchasing power 
risk and interest rate risk. The default risk distinction 
between governments and state-local and corporates can be 
suppressed as negligible by assuming that life insurance 
companies only consider high quality bonds for investment. 
Corporates and state-local securities share similar 
risks and might serve the same purpose in a portfolio and 
thus would tend to be substitutes. However, the interest 
on state and local government bonds is tax free, which would 
tend to make them an attractive profitable investment. This 
feature of state and local government bonds should be re­
flected in their yields and should not make any difference with 
respect to the risk classification described earlier. 
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CHAPTER IV. MONETARY POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON SECURITY PRICES AND YIELDS 
Because the flow of life insurance company investments is 
distributed among several securities spanning virtually the 
entire national market for loanable funds, there are many 
points at which one would expect that Federal Reserve System 
(Fed) policy can exert influence. 
As discussed earlier, life insurance company investments 
are mostly in long-term, fixed-income obligations, which are 
subject to wide swings in market prices occasioned by changes 
in long-term interest rates. Life insurance companies are 
competitive and seek the highest returns from their port­
folios and thus would be sensitive to changing differentials 
in investment yields. An example of the effect of the Fed's 
policy might be as follows : 
An easy money policy would increase the net free reserves 
of commercial banks. This would increase the availability of 
loanable funds and lower rates on loans. The policy, at least 
initially, could be expected to result in an increase in com­
mercial banks' purchases of short-term government securities, 
resulting in a decline in yields of shorter-term government 
securities. The reduction in yield and the increased avail­
ability of loanable funds would act to bring down the entire 
structure of short-term loan rates. 
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As the rates on shorts decline, banks would tend to be­
come more competitive in the long-term lending field. A 
reduction in short-term rates and a tendency for long-term 
rates to soften would encourage prospective long-term borrowers 
to make greater use of short-term commercial bank financing 
in anticipation of lower long-term borrowing costs. 
One possible effect of all this could be a decline in 
the yield of new offerings of corporate bonds. If the yield 
on corporates declines, life insurance companies, given the 
risk differentiation above, could be expected to shift in­
vestment emphasis to mortgages, thus transmitting the credit-
easing effect to the residential mortgage market, by in­
creasing availability of funds in that area. 
The speed with which this can be done will be dictated by 
demand and supply and the expectations of investors. When 
the Fed creates expectations of credit ease, the increased 
willingness of investors to commit their funds while rates are 
still comparatively high should strengthen market forces to­
ward ease and vice versa. 
In summary, credit ease would tend to lead to a fully 
committed forward position and investment shifts to areas 
where yields are not declining as fast, e.g., from corporate 
bonds to residential mortgages, especially government-under­
written mortgages. 
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On the other hand, when the Fed shifts to a stringent 
monetary policy and tightens the reserve position of banks 
and thus the general availability of bank credit, to obtain 
funds for loan expansion, banks would dispose of shorter-
term government securities. This would result in a rise in 
short-term interest rates. An expanding demand for business 
and industrial loans would also contribute to this rise. 
Thus, with expanding loan demand and rising short-term 
interest rates, commercial banks would tend to reduce their 
term-lending and their purchases of state and local government 
bonds, thus contributing to lesser availability of long-
term financing. 
The rise in short-term rates, would tend to induce more 
demand for long-term borrowing, setting in motion a general 
rise of long-term rates. This rise will be reinforced and 
accelerated by the expectations of borrowers and investors. 
When borrowers expect increasing rates, they would seek 
financing promptly to avoid expected higher rates. And as 
investors anticipate rising rates, they would be less willing 
to commit fully their anticipated cash flow in order to take 
advantage of expected higher rates in the future. 
Thus, tightening the credit spigot would affect the 
long-term capital markets through arbitrage and expectations. 
As yields on corporate bonds rise, life insurance 
25 
companies would tend to be less willing to assume a fully 
committed position with respect to their cash flow. Invest­
ment emphasis should shift to areas where yields are sensi­
tive and rising and away from areas where yields are slower 
to change. Specifically, this would mean shifting to direct 
placements of corporate securities and industrial and com­
mercial mortgages and away from government-insured and 
guaranteed mortgages, where interest rates are less flexible. 
The rising rates, also might impair the ability of life 
insurance companies to generate cash flows for investment. 
Monetary policy affects the value of fixed-income assets. 
Tight money policy would affect the ability of the companies 
to raise investible funds through the sale of existing 
holdings. 
As interest rates rise in response to market pressures 
and a restrictive credit policy, capital values of fixed-
income obligations decline so that any effort to sell existing 
holdings would be at a loss. However, life insurance companies 
may still sell securities at a loss to raise funds with which 
to acquire higher-yielding securities or mortgages, if the 
higher return after taxes on the new securities will make up 
for the loss in a short time. 
Policy loans might increase as a result of tight money. 
As interest rates rise, policyholders may find it advantageous 
26 
to borrow on their policies with fixed contractual rates, if 
that rate becomes lower than the rate charged by commercial 
banks. While this may not necessarily affect the cash flow 
of life insurance companies, it might result in a decline of 
cash flow for investments in bonds and mortgages. It could 
make companies more cautious about forward commitment and 
raise concern about their liquidity positions. 
Tight money also might have some effect on mortgage re­
payments, which constitute an important part of the gross 
cash flow of life insurance companies. Regular eunortization 
and partial prepayment would not be affected, but re­
financing mortgages and thus unscheduled repayments might 
decline. 
Federal debt management policy, though not of specific 
interest in this study, would affect life insurance companies 
in about the same ways as general policy measures by the Fed. 
By easing or restricting credit, debt management would result 
in changes in interest rates and expectations and thus in­
vestments. These, just as the actions by the Fed, would 
cause shifts in the direction of the flow of funds, affect 
the capital values of assets, result in changes in total 
cash flow of companies, and affect forward commitment 
policies. 
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CHAPTER V. PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 
It was stated earlier that the objective of life insuramarkcs 
companies is to maximize the rate of return on their port­
folios subject to some constraints. To achieve this objec­
tive would require that the companies hold efficient portfoB.ii0.lo€ 
at all times and adjust those portfolios as rates of returns % 
or risks change over time. 
An efficient portfolio is one that has the maximum retuniurn 
in its risk class, or one that has the minimum risk in its 
return class, and is a legitimate portfolio, i.e. has no 
negative weights for some securities (Markowitz, 1959). To 
achieve this efficient portfolio means efficient diversifi­
cation of the portfolio. 
Markowitz efficient diversification involves combining 
securities whose rates of return are less than perfectly 
positively correlated in order to reduce risk in the port­
folio without sacrificing any of the portfolio's return. In m 
general, the lower the correlation of the rates of return oC if 
the assets in a portfolio, the less risky the portfolio willL U 
be, regardless of the risk associated with individual assets & 
contained in the portfolio (Markowitz, 1959). 
If the investment manager were operating in a world of 
certainty, and if perfect information were available in ad­
vance on the returns and risks of the various securities, he @ 
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simply would invest his wealth in the one asset with the 
highest expected return in order to maximize his utility. How­
ever, due to uncertainties, he can only maximize what he ex­
pects utility to be, since he does not know what it will 
actually turn out to be. Thus risk enters the analysis. 
The relationship between the investor's utility and his 
investments, can be specified as 
E(U) = f{E(r), risk} = f{E(r), a}, (5.1) 
where 
E(r) is the expected rate of return, and 
(7, the standard deviation, is the measure of risk. 
We define risk as the variability of expected returns from in­
vestments in the different securities. A more formal analysis 
of risk will focus on the probability distributions of rates 
of return. 
We define the expected value of the probability distribu­
tion or the mean of returns as 
f 
E(r) = Zp%r% (5.2) 
where 
r^ is the kth outcome, and 
p^ is the probability of that outcome or return, and 
k = l,...,n = all possible outcomes or rates of returns. 
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The variance of returns measures the dispersion of the 
probability distribution and is defined as: 
= Epjç{rjç-E(r) (5.3) 
The standard deviation, which will be used as the measure 
of risk is defined as: 
= ^/%^Pk[(rk-B(r)]2 = jE{r-E(r)}2. (5.4) 
Standard deviation is the measure of risk that will be 
adopted in this study as the index of unpredictability or 
risk to measure the spread or dispersion of the probability 
distribution. 
Its principal advantages are technical (Tobin, 1965, 
p. 17): a) If the central tendency of the probability 
distribution is described by the mathematical expectation, the 
standard deviation is, for reasons of probability theory, the 
natural measure of dispersion, b) The standard deviation of 
the return of a compound portfolio can be easily derived from 
the standard deviations, and correlations, of the returns on 
the constituent portfolios. 
It was stated above that, in general, a portfolio will 
be less risky the lower the correlation of its constituent 
assets' rates of return. We define correlation as: 
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cov(r.,r.) a,. E{ (r.-E (r. ) ) (r .-E (r . ) ) } 
"13= ^ — — <5.5) 
2Pt{(Ti -E(ri))(rj - E(rj) )} 
= 
One can now proceed to construct a diversified efficient 
portfolio, with a knowledge of the correlation coefficients 
between the various assets' rates of return, i.e., after 
ascertaining if the assets are independent or share similar 
risks and thus will act as complements or substitutes in the 
portfolio. 
A correlation coefficient can vary between -l£p£+l. 
An extreme of +1 indicates perfect positive correlation 
between the two assets' rates of return, and means that the 
two move in the same direction, by the same proportion at 
the same time. An P; ^ of -1 indicates perfect negative cor-
J 
relation and the two securities' rates of return vary in­
versely. 
Having determined the rates of return, the expected 
future rates and the risks associated with these expected 
rates, one can solve for the optimum proportion of each 
asset to be held in the portfolio. 
Let Wj^ be the proportion of the ith security in the 
portfolio. A necessary constraint for a meaningful analysis 
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of the portfolio problem is 
n 
Zwj = 1 
i 
This means that the fractions invested in the different 
securities sum to one, and that all funds allocated for 
portfolio selection are accounted for. 
If r^ represents actual return from a portfolio and 
E(rp) its expected return, Efr^) may be defined thus: 
n J 
E(r ) = 2w^E(r^) = Ew. ZP..r.^ (5.6) 
P k j=li] 
where 
J 
Etr^) = E P.^r^.; r^^ = jth outcome on the ith asset 
j=l and J is the number of possible 
outcomes. 
This says that the expected return on a portfolio is the 
weighted average of the expected returns from the assets 
contained in the portfolio. 
In general, the variance or variability of return of a 
portfolio can now be written as: 
Or = Var(r ) = E{r -E(r )}% (5.7) 
p P tr tr 
For a two-security portfolio, the variance expression can be 
derived and expressed in the following way. 
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oj = Var(rp) = E{rp-E (rp> (5.7) 
= E[w^r^ + Wgrg - Efw^r^+wgrg)}^ 
2 
= Efw^ri + *2^2 " - W2E(r2)] 
= E [w^^{r^E (r^^) } + - Efrg)}]^ 
= E[w^^{r2-E(r^)}2+ W2^{r2-E(r2) 
+ 2Wj^W2{r^-E (rj^) }{r2-E(r2}] 
= Wi^E{r^-E(r^)}^ + W2^E{r2-E{r2) 
+ 2w^W2E{ (rj^-E(r^) (r^-ECr^) } 
= Var(rj^) + Varfrg) + covfr^rg) 
n n n 
= Z w. a.. + Z S WjW^G.. 
i j i 3 
for i?^j 
n n 
= Z Z w.w.a.. in matrix notation. 
i=l j=l ] ] 
This expression says that the variance of a weighted 
sum is the sum of the weighted variances plus the covariance 
terms for all possible pairs of securities in the portfolio. 
There are n expected returns for the n securities; n 
variances for the n expected returns, and (n -n)/2 covariances 
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between all possible pairs of expected returns. 
The utility function of the companies can be expressed as 
U = f (E(rp) , a) 
where 
E(r ) = Expected return from the portfolio 
and 
a = risk associated with the portfolio. 
The function is assumed positive with respect to returns 
and negative with respect to risk. The objective of the 
companies is to maximize the utility function subject to 
n 
Z Wz = 1 
i=l 1 
which says that all of the investible funds are just accounted 
for or that the weights of the various assets in the portfolio 
sura to'one. There are seven assets generally listed in the 
portfolios of life insurance companies (Life Insurance Fact 
Book, 1974): mortgages, corporate bonds, U.S. government 
bonds, state and local government bonds, stocks, real estate 
and foreign government bonds. The problem can be set up as 
a Lagrangian objective function:^ 
^Proof that the second order conditions exist to ensure 
a maximum is omitted here. 
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n n n 
Z = U{ E w.E(r.), E Ew.w.a..} + X(Ew.-l) (5.8) 
i=l 1 ^ i i 1 ^ 
To get the first order conditions for an extremum, the 
partial derivatives of the function with respect to the 
seven assets and the constraint are set equal to zero. 
^ ^ 3E(ri) B(ri) + &vâr(2*1*11+2*2*12+^*3*13*^*4^14 
+2WgG^g+2Wg0^g+2w^G^y] + X = 0 (5.9) 
3w2 aE^rg) ^(^2) + 3var^^*2*22+2*1*12+2*3023+2*4*24 
+2*5*25*2*6*26*2*7*27] + X = 0 (5.10) 
awg aEfrg) ^(^3) + avar^^*3*33*^*1*13*^*2*23+^*4*34 
"''^*5035+^*6*36+2*7*37^ + X = 0 (5.11) 
3w^ ~ dêjrJT ^ (^4) + 395^(2*4*44+2*1*14+2*2*24+2*3*34 
+2*5*45+2*4*46+2*7*47] + ^ = 0 (5.12) 
Hr " âMrIT ^ (^5) + 5§5r (2*5*55+2*1*15+2*2*25+2*3*35 
5 5 
+ ^*4045+^*6*56+2*7057] ^  X = 0 (5.13) 
35 
(5.14) 
SVar [2w7077+2w^G27+2w2G27+^W3037 
(5.15) 
71 = W]^-W2-W3-W4-W5-Wg-W7-1 = 0 (5.16) 
On the assumption that the investors take the risk associated 
with each asset as given, it can be considered a constant 
and the system of n+1 equations can be expressed as a Jacobian 
matrix. In setting up the matrix, the current yields also 
are assumed to be good proxies of the expected yields, and 
therefore are treated as constants in trying to find the 
weights of the various assets that would give an efficient 
portfolio; 
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au 
Wâf 
2a 2a^ 2 ^^ 13 ^^ 14 ^^ 15 ^^ 16 ^^ 17 ^  
2*21 2*22 2*^23 ^*24 ^*25 ^*26 ^*27 ^ 
203I 2032 2*33 2*34 2*35 Zogg Zogy 1 
2*41 20^2 2*43 2G44 2a^^ 1 
2*51 2052 2053 2054 2055 ^Cgg 2Gg^ 1 
2*61 2*62 2*63 2ag^ 2agg 2agg 2o^^ 1 
2*71 2a^2 2a^3 2a^^ 2a^^ 2a^^ 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0  
Wi 
Wr 
W-
W4 
W,  
w. 
w. 
3U 
3E(ri) 
Efr^) 
BU _, , 
aE(r_)E(r2) 
aE(ri)B(r3) 
au V 
aE(r.)B(r4) 
lëwSfrs) 
aE(rc)G(r6) 
(5.17) 
The solution of the system will give the n+1 variables in 
the weight vector in terms of the expected rates of return on 
the assets. Let the coefficient matrix be C, the weight 
vector w, and the vector of expected returns E. The system 
now becomes Cw = E, from which we can get: 
-1 -1 C ^Cw = C ^E 
w = C~^E 
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The solution for the weights will be of the general 
3U 
form; w^ = 3Ë(r. )E(ri) , where Cj^ and are some 
constants. 
Using Cramer's rule, the general form of the solution 
for the weight of each asset also may be obtained by re­
placing the appropriate column in the coefficient matrix by 
the vector of constants and dividing the resulting matrix 
by the determinant of the original matrix of coefficients. 
For instance, the weight of security 1 in the portfolio can 
be found as follows: 
38 
Hû-yECri) 2*12 2*13 2*14 =*15 =*16 ^*17 
2^22 2*23 ^^25 ^*26 ^*27 
iElr^^(^3) 2CT32 Zogg 2034 Zogg Zogg 2*37 
au 
•E(r-) 2a.« 2a._ 2a.. 2o 2a, _ 2cr 
3E(r4)"'"4' "42 "43 44 45 "46 47 
ll(îiT®"^5> '"52 '°53 '"54 '°55 '"56 '°57 
an 
•jrg-^yECrg) 2ag2 2ag3 20^4 20^5 2agg Zog? 
6 
•Ulr^ ECry) 2a^2 2^73 2a^g 2a^^ 
1  1 1 1 1 1 1  
2*11 20^2 2aj^3  
2*21 2^22 2^23 202^ 2O25 202g 
2*31 2032 2033 2034 2035 2a3g 2a^ y  
2*41 2G42 2*43 2^44  20^5  2a^g 2a^^ 
2*51 2^52 2053 20g2 2ag5 20^2 20^^ 
2*61 2Gg2 2ag3 2(jg4 20^^ 2a^^ 2Q 
2*71 20^2 20^3 20^4 2a^5 2a.7g 2a^^ 
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The weights of the other securities can be found in a 
similar way. The solutions exist provided the original 
coefficient matrix is nonsingular. 
We have now devised a way that would permit us to deter­
mine monetary policy impact, if any, on the portfolio composi­
tion of life insurance companies. Securities in the portfolio 
are related to each other either as complements or substi­
tutes. Given these relationships, if we can isolate periods 
of tighter and easier monetary policy, we can test the 
hypothesis that changes in the rates of return of the securi­
ties during these periods will induce portfolio adjustments 
resulting in different weights for the securities such as to 
maintain an efficient portfolio with the maximum return subject 
to risk considerations. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it should be pointed 
cut that transactions costs and illiquidities would affect 
the willingness of the companies to revise their portfolios. 
Asset exchange costs, illiquidities and irreversibilities 
impart some inertia and stability to portfolio choices, 
keeping the planned period for holding any portfolio from 
being infinitesimally short- Shifts involve some cost in 
time, effort and money and thus any new portfolio must 
promise enough advantage in return over the old to compen­
sate for these costs (Tobin, 1965). 
Tobin argues that innumerable portfolio sequences are 
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available to the investment manager as new information is 
gathered and expectations about rates of returns are modi­
fied. Each sequence specifies the quantities of all the 
assets to be held on every date. Each sequence implies 
different transactions costs. At one extreme are portfolio 
sequences involving no shifts and no exchange costs. At 
the other extreme are sequences involving daily or hourly 
shifts in response to small or temporary differences in 
asset prospects. 
The impact of shifting costs on portfolio sequence 
choices, argued Tobin, depends on, among other things, the 
relation of the costs to a) the number of portfolio shifts, 
b) the number of assets involved in a shift, and (c) the 
total value of transactions (Tobin, 1965). 
Costs of type (a) encourage infrequent but thorough 
portfolio revisions. Costs of type (b) are an incentive to 
minimize the number of assets involved in any portfolio shift 
and to concentrate on particular occasions the dealings in any 
one asset. To save costs of type (c), the investor will seek 
to keep the total value of transactions down; but in the 
absence of the other two relationships, he would not care 
whether shifts were frequent and small or infrequent and 
large. 
How would these considerations affect the portfolio 
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revisions of life insurance companies? 
The obligations of life insurance companies are long-
term in nature. Thus, one would expect that except for 
purposes of maintaining some desired liquidity position, the 
assets in a typical life insurance company portfolio would 
be long-term and not short-term. This makes frequent 
portfolio adjustments infeasible. Huge shifts from one 
security into another could involve large losses when one 
tries to dispose of long-term securities in advance of their 
maturity dates. 
However, the argument remains that shifts will be made 
and the portfolio adjusted, when such a move is deemed 
profitable. 
A two-security portfolio is now analyzed to see how 
changes in the rates and expected rates of return will affect 
the weights of the various securities in the portfolio. 
Let the first of the two securities be U.S. government 
securities (g), and the second be all other securities com­
bined (o). 
U.S. governments are chosen because the Fed has a direct 
control over them with respect to volume outstanding and 
yields, more so than any other security. 
For this portfolio, the objective function to be 
maximized is: 
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2 2 2 
Z = U{ E WiE(ri), Z Ewjw.oii} + X(Ew.-l) (5.19) 
i=l i i J ^ 
= U{w^E(ri)+W2E(r2), Wg^a^g + + WgW^Ogo} 
+ XXw^+Wg-l) 
where 
Wg = weight of government securities 
Wq = weight of all other securities 
E(r ) = expected return on governments with variance 
'gg 
ECr^) = expected return on others combined with variance 
®oo 
The constraint is the same as before: Zw^-l = 0. The 
partial derivatives of the function with respect to the 
weights and constraint are set equal to zero: 
Ifc ' + Ifep Vgg'*^"oV' + * * » 
50- " 3E(r-)^''^o' + lfer'^"o''oo+%''go' + * = 0 (5.21) 
II =  W i + W g  - 1 = 0  ( 5 . 2 2 )  
As before, the equations can be expressed as a Jacobian 
matrix: 
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au 
3Var 
•" 
2a 2 a _ 1 W gg go g 
2a 2a__ 1 w go oo o 
1 1 0 \ 
MM Mb 
3E(rg)®'V 
3U , 
aE(rn) (5.23) 
The two weights can be solved for using Cramer's rule. 
3U 
3E(rg)^(rg) ^og^ 1 
aE(r ^®oo 
2a 
2a 
99 
go 
1 
2a go 
2a 
oo 
0 3U 
3Var ~ (5.24) 
Expanding the top and bottom matrices by their third columns 
using the formula jC^^I = (-1) jM^j j ; 
3U 
= 
3E(r^)"'"o 
1] 
E(r_) - 2a 
oo 3E(r ^°go ^ 
S 
4 a — 2 a —2 o go oo gg 
(5.25) 
The weight of all other securities combined, w^, can be 
solved for similarly, or, since Wg+W^ = 1, 
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Wq = 1-Wg. (5.26) 
Having found these weights, the task now is to determine 
what, if anything, happens to them when the Fed moves, as an 
excunple, from a relatively tight money policy to a relatively 
easy money policy. A formal definition of tightness and 
ease will be given later. 
A change in monetary policy would be expected to change 
the rate of return on U.S. government securities. This change 
would, in return, alter the weights of the two securities in 
the portfolio assuming the yields of the other securities 
stay the same and the risk associated with holding government 
securities does not increase with an increase in their re­
turns. 
Suppose r^ increased as a result of a change in mone­
tary policy. Then, the weight of government securities would 
be expected to increase and the weight of the other securi­
ties, w^, would be expected to decline. 
This relationship can be expressed more formally by taking 
partial derivatives of the weights from the two-security port­
folio with respect to changes in the rate of return on govern­
ment securities. A specific answer will not be provided 
here, but can be obtained through a simulated experiment 
with actual numbers plugged into the equation or through a 
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sign analysis. The general solution above for the weights 
provides the framework for the empirical section, which is 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI. DERIVATION OF THE ASSET 
DEMAND EQUATIONS 
In Chapter V, it was shown how life insurance companies 
could go about the process of selecting an efficient port­
folio and what proportion of total portfolio each asset would 
constitute. Although transactions costs and their impacts 
were discussed in Chapter V, it was assumed implicitly that 
transactions costs were zero. In the derivation in the 
present chapter of the form of the demand equations that 
will be estimated, it will be assumed that life insurance 
companies either hold or strive for efficient portfolios. How­
ever, transactions costs are explicitly taken into account, 
thus necessitating the use of a stock adjustment model. 
The form of the asset demand equations that will be 
tested empirically in this study will be similar to Silber's, 
discussed in Chapter II but with modifications. 
The liabilities of life insurance companies are of a 
long-term nature and the amount of disbursements to meet 
these liabilities are highly predictable. As a result, most 
investments by life insurance companies are long-term. Based 
on this premise, frequent portfolio adjustments in terms of 
already committed funds would seem unlikely under most normal 
circumstances. 
Of major interest in this study is determining how the 
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companies allocate their net inflow of funds (premium income 
» 
and income from matured investments) to the various assets 
in their portfolio. 
Specifically, the form of the estimated demand equations 
can be derived as follows: 
(Si/A) 2 = a^ + aj^{rj,^} + ai+^A (6.1) 
Equation 6.1 expresses the desired level of the ith asset, S^^, 
(as a proportion or ratio of total assets at time t), as a 
function of a vector of the relevant yields {r^^J and the 
total volume of assets A. 
By arguing that the current value of the ith asset in the 
portfolio depends on its current desired value and past de­
sired values, where past desired values are assumed to in­
corporate the values of the explanatory variables, we can 
write I 
n . 
(Si/A)t = X S (1-X) (Si/A)*_i = X(Si/A)* 
i=0 
+ X ? (l-X)i(Si/A)*_i (6.2a) 
i=l 
where 
0<X<1. 
Equation 6.2a argues that current values of the ith 
asset in the portfolio are obtained by partially adjusting 
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the level of that asset in each period in an attempt to attain 
a desired level of that asset in the portfolio. Equation 6.2a 
can be expanded to get: 
(Si/A)t = X{(Si/A)* + (l-A)(Si/A)*_i 
+ (l-X)^(Si/A)*_2 +...+ (1-X)"(5i/A)*_n} (6.2b) 
By applying Koyck transformation (Koyck, 1954), both 
sides of 6.2b are lagged one period and multiplied by (1-A) 
to get; 
(l-X)(Si/A)t_i = X{(l-A)(Si/A)*_i + (l-X)(Si/A)*_i 
+ (l-X)2(Si/A)2_2 +...+ (l-X)*(Si/A)*_n 
+ (l-X)*+l(Si/A)*_n+i} (6.3) 
Subtracting Equation (6.3) from (6.2b) yields: 
(Si/A)t - (l-X)(Si/A)t_i = X(Si/A)| (6.4) 
where the last term in Equation (6.3) is considered close 
enough to zero that it can be ignored. 
Manipulation of Equation (6.4) yields: 
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(Si/A)t - (Si/A)t_i + X(Si/A)t_i = X(S^/A)* (6.5) 
Substituting A(S^/A)^ for (S^/A)^-(S^/A)^_^ and trans­
ferring X(S^/A)^_^ to the right, we get: 
A (Si/A) t = X(Si/A)*-X(Si/A)t_i " (6.6) 
We can substitute Equation (6.1) for (S^/A)* in Equation 6.6 
to get 
A (Sj^/A) ^  = XaQ + A^a^r^^} + ^®i+l^ " ^^^i/^^t-l (6.7) 
Equation 6.7 is the equation that will be estimated. It 
is consistent with the argument that it is not the total 
level of each asset at time t that is relevant to the port­
folio manager, since part of that portfolio already is in­
vested. The manager is more concerned with allocating net 
increases in reserves than with juggling or rearranging the 
portfolio. The task then is to try arid isolate those factors 
that determine how much of the net change in total assets 
is allocated to each asset in the portfolio. 
Using ordinary least squares estimation, the value of X 
will be the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
Once X is obtained, the other coefficients can be recovered 
by dividing through by the value of X. 
The usual classical assumptions about the disturbance 
or error tejnn in ordinary least squares regressions are 
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assumed to hold: 
E~N(0, a^); E(ej^ej) = 0, (i^j) 
If the Durbin-Watson statistic (Durbin and Watson, 1950, 
1951) indicates that the residuals of an equation are auto-
correlated, the autoregressive equation of the residuals 
will be estimated to get the coefficient p. This coefficient 
will then be used to transform all the variables in the 
original equation. The equation will be reestimated using the 
transformed variables. For example, if we assume that the 
disturbance follows a first-order autoregressive scheme, 
= pU^_2 + will be estimated; |p| <1 and satisfies 
the assumptions : 
E(Et) = 0 (6.9a) 
E(e^E^._) = s=0 (6.9b) 
} for all t 
= 0 s?^0 (6.9c) 
The original equation will then be reestimated in the follow­
ing form to remove the autocorrelation: 
(Si/A)^ - p(Si/A)t_i = a^d-p) + ai(rit-prit_i) + 
(6 .10)  
Interest rates will be entered in the equations either 
as levels or as differentials. That is, instead of using 
the level of each interest rate as an explanatory variable. 
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the difference between the yield on the asset whose demand is 
being estimated and each of the other yields will be used. 
For example, if we estimate the demand for with the rates 
^1' ^ 2 ^3' expressing it with the rates as differentials, 
we get 
Xi = a^(r2-r^) + 0C2^^3'^1^ 
Interest rate levels tend to move together which may result 
in serious multicollinearity problems. So, the specification 
of the interest rate variables as differentials rather than 
levels might prove statistically helpful in terms of allevia­
ting the multicollinearity problem, which could mask 
statistically significant regression coefficients. 
Also, interest rate differentials seem more pertinent 
than absolute levels to the portfolio manager in his decision 
on the flow of investment funds in a given period. The 
absolute levels might be of prime concern if the decision were 
a question of how much cash to hold versus how much securi­
ties to purchase. 
The use of differentials also implies that if some factor 
were added to each rate, the distribution of funds among the 
various securities would be unaffected. The use of differen­
tials, however, imposes a restriction on the sign of the own 
rate of return. For example, if we estimate (Sj^/A)^ = 
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a. (r.-r.) + a (r -r.): where r. is the rate on the jth 
J- J 1 6 je 1 ] 
security; r^ is the rate on the kth security, and r^ is the 
own rate for the sign of r^ = -(a^) plus -(ag) or the 
negative of the sum of the coefficients attached to r. and r. 
respectively. Due to this restriction on the sign of the own 
rate, the interest rate variables also will be specified as 
levels in some cases. 
It should be pointed out that expected future rates were 
not built in specifically as arguments in the equations. How­
ever, the presence of a lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable, incorporates a particular weighted 
average of past rates and all other explanatory variables 
that may have been left out. The lagged dependent variable 
is the usual proxy for expected rates (De Leeuw, 1965). 
Also, it was argued earlier that current yields are good 
proxies for expected future rates= 
In this study, only the demand for the major assets in 
the portfolio of life insurance companies will be estimated. 
There are some assets that are a very small proportion of total 
assets or that have changed very little over the sample 
period. The demand for this group of assets, which includes 
real estate holdings, foreign government bonds and "other 
assets", will not be estimated. 
Since the estimation technique that will be used in this 
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study is single-equation, ordinary least squares, it does not 
matter much to the results that will be obtained that these 
items will be left out. However, even in a simultaneous 
equation approach, the problems of not estimating the demand 
for this group of assets could be solved by simply imposing a 
balance sheet identity on the portfolio of the companies. 
Given n assets in the portfolio, and the size of the port­
folio, only n-1 of those assets can be functionally inde­
pendent. The group of assets considered as residuals can 
then be determined by the balance sheet identity. This pro­
cedure, while not necessary for single equation estimation, 
is implicit in the approach. 
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CHAPTER VII. ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND EQUATIONS, 
HYPOTHESES TESTING AND RESULTS 
The estimated demand equations cover the period of 
January 1963 through March 1974, i.e., 1963-1 through 1974-1. 
Most of the data used were obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, which provides^«comprehensive set of tables 
on the flow of funds through the economy. The data on the 
assets of life insurance companies were reported as seasonally 
unadjusted monthly series. Quarterly averages, created from 
the monthly series, are used in this study. 
Interest rates are expressed in percentages, that is, 
an interest rate of 5 per cent is written as 5.0. The 
following is a brief description of the yield rates that 
were used : 
Government Bond rate: the rate on long-term government 
bonds 
Treasury Bill rate: the rate on three-^onth treasury 
bills 
Corporate Bond rate: the yield on long-term corporate 
bonds prepared by Moody's investor service on Baa 
corporate bonds 
Earnings/Price: a measure of the returns from common 
stocks 
Mortgage rate: the yield on conventional first 
mortgages 
State-Local government bond rate: the yield on 15 high-
grade municipals (Standard and Poor's averages) 
GNP Deflator: obtained from the Survey of Current 
Business 
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The performance of the estimated equations will be 
evaluated by looking at the signs of the coefficients to see 
if they support the a priori specification of either a substi­
tute or complementary relationship among securities. The 
postulation of substitutability or complementarity between 
any two securities will be based on the discussion in Chapter 
III of the risk attributes of the various securities. The 
sign of the own rate of interest is expected to be positive 
— directly so, when interest rates are entered as levels and 
implicitly so when they are entered as differentials. The 
overall reasonableness of the estimated demand equations will 
be determined, in addition, by looking at the correlation 
coefficients and the standard errors of the estimates. 
To test whether two securities are complements, substi­
tutes or independent, assume that the demand for security 
is estimated with the interest rate term b-, (r^-r, ). If b^* 
the coefficient, has a positive sign, and is significant at the 
5 per cent level on a one-tailed t test, security Xg, whose 
rate is rg, and security X^, whose demand is estimated, will 
be considered complements, if b^^, on the other hand, has a 
negative sign and is significant, then Xg and X^, will be 
considered substitutes. If, however, the ratio of the 
coefficient to its standard error (t-value) were smaller than 
about .5, this would be considered an indication that the 
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two securities are independent in the portfolio regardless of 
the sign of the coefficient. This means that if the t-value 
of a coefficient is not significant at the 5 per cent level 
and, in addition, is less than .5 in absolute value, this will 
be considered an indication that the demand for one is un­
affected by changes in the yield for the other. The calcu­
lated t-value of .5 is an arbitrary cutoff and there is 
nothing theoretically magic about it. 
In addition to testing the substitutability and comple­
mentarity of the securities, the individual demand equations 
will be checked against each other for consistency.^ For 
example, one would expect a symmetrical relationship between 
any two equations. If the equation for security A, for 
example, implies that securities A and B are substitutes, then 
the equation for security B, also would be expected to give 
the same relationship between A and 5. 
The estimated equations are presented below using the 
following notations: 
A = total assets 
AA = = change in level of assets 
C = corporate bonds 
^For a discussion of consistency checks, see Brainard 
and Tobin, 1968, pp. 99-122). 
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G = U.S. government bonds 
S = state-local government bonds 
M = mortgages 
K = stocks 
r^ = interest rate on U.S. government bonds 
r^^ = interest rate on three-month treasury bills 
r^ = interest rate on state-local government bonds 
r^ = mortgage yield 
r^ = interest rate on corporate bonds 
E/P = earnings-price ratio on common stocks 
AP/P = rate of change in the GNP deflator 
= seasonal dummy variables i=l,2,3 
Each variable takes on a value of 1 for the quarter repre­
sented by its subscript and is zero elsewhere. The dummy 
variables are included to account for any independent seasonal 
patterns that may exist in the demand for securities. 
The Hypotheses that will be Tested 
1. Equity Capital and all bonds are complements in the 
portfolio. 
2. Mortgages and U.S. government bonds are complements. 
3. Mortgages and corporate bonds are substitutes. 
4. Mortgages and state and local government bonds are 
substitutes. 
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5. U.S. government bonds and state and local government 
bonds are substitutes in the portfolio. 
6. Corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds are substi­
tutes. 
7. Corporate bonds and state and local government bonds 
are substitutes. 
The Demand for Mortgage Holdings 
The demand for mortgage holdings by life insurance 
companies was estimated with the following models: 
û(|) = ao-"l(rc-rm) + "a'VV " "s'l't-l + Vl + «5°2 
4(2) = «0 + - Ogre + + «5°1 
+ + a^Dg (7.2) 
AM = + 03A - + «sD^ 
+ cxg^2 ^7^3 (7.3) 
AM = ctQ+ct^r^ - agfc + ^S-g + " «S^^t-l 
+ OgD^ + a^Dg + OgDg (7.4) 
The results are presented in Tables la and lb. 
Table la. Regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for 
Equations 7.1 through 7.4 
Equation 7.1; Coefficient of 
Dependent constant 
variable r -r c m 
r -r g m 
(M/A)t-1 »1 »2 
A(M/A) .00984 
(1.0974)'= 
-.00384 
(-5.7549) 
.00186 
(1.6819) 
-.02503 
(-1.1438) 
-.00019 
(-.5269) 
-.00047 
(-1.3650) 
Equation 7.2; Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant 
variable ^m ^c 
r g (M/A)t_l °1 
A(^) -.00128 
(-.1264) 
.00284 
(2.2325) 
•r. 00504 
(-5.6899) 
.00346 
(2.5533) 
-.0129 
(-.6101) 
-.00016 
(-.4655) 
Equation 7.3; Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant 
variable ^c"^m 
r -r g m 
A 
"t-1 °1 
AM 318.1106 -
(.4044) 
626.3427 
(-4.1492) 
361.0157 
(1.8181) 
.008 
(1.5857 
-.00986 
(-.4686) 
-200.1155 
(-3.1154) 
Equation 7.4: Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant 
variable 
r 
m 
r 
c 
r g A \-l 
AM 255.8689 
(.3153) 
308.8265 
(1.4438 
-641.8792 
(-4.0870) 
472.3372 
(2.0558) 
,007989 
(1.5219) 
-.0212 
(-.8722 
is the adjusted coefficient of multiple determination, 
^d is the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
^The t-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses 
directly below each coefficient. 
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»3 R2^ ? P P SE 
.00057 .45 2.1249 .4617 5.9408 .000002441 
(1.6414) 
»1 °3 d P P SE 
-.00041 .00061 .51 2.1844 .4338 6.4548 .0000023 
(-1.2085) (1.7900) 
»2 »3 R^ d 
A 
P P SE 
-81.5129 166.1811 .85 2.1756 . 2972 31.514 68445 
(-1.3127) (2.6613) 
°1 »2 »3 
R2 d P F SE 
198.1536 "81.4302 166.4774 .84 2.2115 .3263 26-038 68793 
(-3.1080) (-1.3224) (2.6884) 
Table Ib.^ Disentangled values of the coefficients of ; 
Equation Dependent Constant r -r 
variable ^ ® 
7.1 A (M/A) .3929 -.1535 .0742 -.0250 -.0079 -.0188 0.0228 
Equation Dependent Constant 
Variable 
m 
(M/A) 
t-1 
7.2 A(M/A) -.0992 .2199 -.3908 .2686 -.0129 -.0127 -.0317 
M 
t-1 
.0473 
D. Equation Dependent Constant r -r 
Variable ° " 
7.3 ~Sm 32265.45 -63528.95 36617.24 .8109 -.0099 -20297.4 -8267.72 16855.49 
Equation Dependent Constant 
Variable 
M 
m t-1 
7.4 AH 12061.99 14558.49 -30259.04 22266.6 .3766 -.0212 -9341.7 -3838.73 7847.96 m 
^he only difference between Tables la and Ib is that in lb, the values of the coefficients 
presented in Table la have been disentangled. Each coefficient in Tcible la is divided by X, the 
value of the lagged dependent variable. 
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The demand for mortgages (Equation 7.1) suggests that 
mortgages and corporate bonds are substitutes in the portfolios 
of life insurance companies. The coefficient of (r -r ) has 
c m 
a negative sign and is significantly different from zero at 
the 5 per cent level using a one-tailed t test. This is 
as was hypothesized. The estimated equation also suggests 
that U.S. government bonds and mortgages are complements in 
the portfolio as was hypothesized. The coefficient for 
(rg-r^) is positive and significantly different from zero 
also at the 5 per cent level. It was pointed out earlier 
that mortgages are highly illiquid. It would appear, based 
on the results, that to compensate for the illiquidity 
resulting from an increase in the holdings of mortgages, 
the companies tend to increase their demand for highly liquid 
U.S. government bonds. U.S. government bonds have a highly 
well-organized secondary market and can be sold any time 
with very little difficulty to meet cash needs should the 
companies be strapped for liquidity. 
The implicit own rate for mortgages has a positive 
sign (+.00384 - .00186 = +.00198), which is what we would 
expect. 
The speed of adjustment implied by the coefficient of 
the lagged dependent explanatory variable is that only 
about 3 per cent of the deficiency between desired and 
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actual holdings is made up after one quarter. This implies 
a very long lag in adjustment. 
When the interest rate variables were entered as levels 
instead of differentials (Equation 7.2), the results were 
roughly similar with those of Equation 7.1. These results 
suggest a strong substitute relationship between mortgages 
and corporate bonds and a strong complementary relationship 
between mortgages and government bonds. The speed of adjust­
ment implied by 7.2 was even slower. Less than 2 per cent 
of the discrepancy between actual and desired holdings is 
made up in one quarter. 
When the mortgage: demand was estimated as a level and 
not as a proportion of total assets (Equation 7.3), the 
same significant relationships existed between mortgages and 
corporate bonds and mortgages and U.S. government bonds. 
The implicit own rate is also positive as in 7.1. In 
Equation 7.4, all variables — dependent and independent 
— were entered as levels. Results here are similar to those 
in the preceding three equations. The speed of adjustment 
again is very slow with only 2 per cent of any deficiency 
corrected in the first quarter. 
All four equations tend to support the hypothesized 
relationships between mortgages and the other major assets 
in the portfolios of life insurance companies. However, 
the explanatory power of Equations 7.3 and 7.4, as measured 
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by the adjusted coefficient of multiple determination, 
were higher than those of Equations 7.1 and 7.2. Total assets 
were entered as a variable in 7.3 and 7.4. The t-values 
of its coefficients in both equations were almost signifi­
cant at the 5 per cent level. This is as expected, because 
over the years mortgages have constituted a major proportion 
of the total portfolio. 
Life insurance companies' mortgage holdings increased 
by $4.4 billion during 1973 to a total of $81.4 billion or 
32.2 per cent of total assets at the end of that year (Life 
Insurance Fact Book, 1974). The asset level, however, was 
not included in the final forms of Equations 7.1 and 7.2. 
It was tried, but perhaps, because these two equations 
were expressed as a proportion of total assets, the result 
was insignificant. 
The Demand for Corporate Bonds 
The following models were fitted for the demand for 
corporate bonds : 
AC = *0 + *1^0 - Vg - Vm ' "J* - "6=t-l 
+ + agDg + agDg (7.5) 
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A(C/A) = ao-*i(rg-rc) - " *3 F + "4^  
- ag(C/A)^_^ + otgDj^ + a^Dg + OgDg (7.6) 
AC = ao-aifrg-r^) - a2^^ra~^c^ " *3 F + «4^ 
- OgCt-i + OgDi + o^Dg + OgDg (7.7) 
The results are presented in Tables 2a and 2b. 
The relationships between corporate bonds and the other 
securities implied by the estimated corporate bond demand 
equations presented above are inconclusive. 
In Equation 7.5, the own rate of return is positive 
but insignificant. The coefficient for government bonds is 
negative, suggesting a substitute relationship between 
corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds. However, it 
is insignificantly different from zero and, thus, does not 
support the hypothesis of substitution between the two. 
The coefficient for mortgage rates is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level 
but not at the 5 per cent level. However, to the extent that 
the sign is negative and the t test nearly significant at 
the 5 per cent level, it is consistent with the result of the 
mortgage demand equation. Thus, the symmetry condition 
holds. Both the mortgage and corporate bond demand equations 
Tabic 2a. Regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for 
Equations 7.5 through 7.7 
Equation 7.5; 
Dependent Constant 
variable 
Ac 589.49 
(.8461) 
Coefficient of 
m 
—T— 
P 
Equation 7.6; 
Dependent Constant 
variable 
A(C/A) .0351 
(1.1557) 
7.331 -156.846 -301.334 -245.3055 .621 
(.0347) (-.6129) (-1.2802) (-1.6168) (2.0411) 
Coefficient of 
-f-
V^c 
p 
p (C/A)t-1 
.00094 .00058 -.00147 .000000041 -.1100 
(.8399) (.4894) (-2.2267) (2.3317) (-1.3713) 
Equation 7.7; 
Dependent Constant 
variable 
Sc -643.4377 
(-.8988) 
Coefficient of 
r_-r 
m c 
t 
P 't-1 
469.7475 94.7313 -358.3541 .1231 -.3013 
(1.8950) (.3674) (-2.5167) (3.1193) (-2.7427) 
^he value of p is given only for the equations whose variables 
were transformed. 
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°1 °2 Dg d 0 SE 
-.1174 -65.1531 88.2533 -130.4283 .70 1.7947 81682 
(-1.3871) (-.8266) (1.1612) (-1.6180) 
Dg Dj d ^ SE 
.0005 -.0005 -.0009 TSi 1.8814 .2952 .000002 
(1.4160) (-1.3199) (-2.3464) 
Dg Dg R d 0 SE 
-41.003 118.9456 -89.5712 ^84 1.77 .3797 92473 
(-5.487) (1.6775) (-1.1997) 
Table 2b. Disentangled values of the coefficients of; 
Equation Dependent Constant P/P A C^ ^  D^ D^ D^ 
TTS Se 5021.2 6275 -1336.5 -2657.7 -2090.3 .5291 -.1174 -555.2 752.0 -1111.4 
Equation Dependent Constant r -r r -r P/P A C. , D. D D 
variable I % 
7.6 A(C/A) .3186 .0085 .0052 -.0133 .0000004 -.1101 .0045 .0041 -.0077 
Equation Dependent Constant r -r r -r P/P AC. D. D D 
variable ^ ^ 
7.7 Ac -2135.5 1559.1 314.4 -1189.3 .4086 -.3013 -136.1 394.8 -297.3 
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suggest that the two assets are substitutes in the portfolios 
of life insurance companies. 
The rate of inflation variable, P/P, is significant at 
the 10 per cent level and is negative. This is as expected. 
The rationale is that since life insurance companies can 
hedge against inflation by buying stocks, for instance, 
they will do so in the face of rising price levels. They 
will get out of, or at least not commit as much of their 
funds to such assets as bonds, which are susceptible to 
a loss in purchasing power at maturity due to inflation. 
Under such circumstances, more funds would be channelled 
into stocks under the presumption that rising price levels 
in general will mean rising business incomes and profits 
and thus rising value of stocks. 
When the corporate demand equation was estimated as a 
porportion of total assets with interest rate variables 
entered as levels and not as differentials, only one 
explanatory variable, the lagged dependent variable, was 
significant. Many of the signs were incorrect. A reesti­
mation of the same equation using rate differentials 
produced a result that is only slightly better (Equation 
7.6). 
The implicit own rate in 7.6 is negative. The coeffi­
cient of r^^r^ is positive, contrary to the hypothesis 
and the result from the mortgage demand equation which 
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suggests that mortgages and corporate bonds are substi­
tutes. However, the t test on the coefficient is in­
significant, indicating that corporate bonds and mortgages 
may be independent. This is an unlikely result, consider­
ing that corporate bonds and mortgages are the two biggest 
components of life insurance companies' portfolios. 
The inflation variable was stronger in 7.6 than in 
7.5. It was significant at the 5 per cent level in 7.6 
and at the 10 per cent level in 7.5 and had a negative 
sign in both, suggesting, as hypothesized, that the 
companies would move away from bonds when the general price 
level in the economy is rising. 
Equation 7.6 also implies that U.S. government bonds 
and corporate bonds are complements. The sign on the 
coefficient of is positive. However, the t test is 
insignificant at both the 5 and the 10 per cent level. 
This result is contrary to the finding in 7.5, which 
suggests that the two are substitutes. 
Both Equations 7.5 and 7.6 imply very long lags or 
slow speeds of adjustment. Both equations indicate that 
only 11 per cent of the deficiency is made up within the 
first quarter. Overall, the explanatory power of 7.6 is 
rather low. 
When equation 7.5 was reestimated with interest rates 
in differential form rather than levels, 7.7, the result 
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was slightly better than 7.6, but not as good as 7.5. 
The implicit own rate in 7.7 is wrong, just as in 7.6 
However, the t tests on the coefficients of 7.7 are more 
definitive than those of 7.6. The t score on the coeffi­
cient of rg-r^, is significant at the 5 per cent level 
indicating a complementary relation between corporate 
bonds and government bonds. The coefficient of r^^Tg is 
positive, but the t test is highly insignificant implying 
that mortgages and corporate bonds are independent — again 
an unlikely event. 
The inflation variable P/P was strongest in 7.7. 
The speed of adjustment implied by 7.7 is that 30 per 
cent of the deficiency between actual and desired levels 
of corporate bonds is corrected within one quarter. This 
is considerably faster than in the first two equations. 
In all three equations, the asset level was correctly 
signed and significantly different from zero at the 5 
per cent level on a one-tailed t test. This is not 
surprising. Over the sample period, corporate bonds 
averaged about 36 per cent of the total portfolio. At the 
end of 1973, they constituted 36.4 per cent of all assets. 
Overall, the estimated demand equations for corporate 
bonds gave inconsistent and unsatisfactory results. 
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The Demand for Stocks 
The following models were fitted for the demand for 
common stocks by life insurance companies: 
A(K/A) = ag + ai(rg-E/P) - o^lr^^E/P) + a^AA 
- a^(K/A)^_i + + agDg + a^Dg (7.8) 
A(K/A) = olq + a^E/P - agr^ + OL^^g G4A& 
- ag(K/A)^_i + ttgD^ + a^Dg + OgD^ (7.9) 
AK = ttQ + ttj^Cr^-E/P) - a2 (ï^jjj~E/P) + a^AA 
- + OgDg + a^Dg (7.10) 
AK - Oq a-j^E/P = «2^111 Gg'g ^4^ 
+ + OgD^ + ayDj + a^Dj (7.11) 
The results are presented below in Tables 3a and 3b. 
Table 3a. Regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics 
for Equations 7.8 through 7.11 
Equation 7.8; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r -E/P r -E/P Aa (K/A)^ _ D, 
variable S ^ i 
A(K/A) .0023 .0024 -.0010 .000003 -.0823 -0092 
(.8668) (2.0168) (-.9046) (6.8866) (-4.9045) (1.8368) 
Equation 7.9; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant E/P r r AA (K/A) ^ , D, 
variable 2 2 ^^ 
A(K/A) .0014 -.0013 -.0011 .0026 .000003 --088 .0009 
(.3816)(-3.0440)(-.9200)(1.9826)(6.1569)(-3.61119)(1.8397) 
Equation 7.10; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r -E/P r_-E/P AA , D, 
variable ^ ^ 
AK -108.27 530.8466 -256.2717 .7447 -.0496 213.2363 
(-0.1927) (2.1588) (-1.1022) (8.6424) (-4.3839) (2.1020) 
Equation 7.11: Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant E/P r_ r AA K. . 
variable ' l ^-1 
AK -307.33 -256.0785 -261.9621 556.9064 .7602 -.0535 
(-.3576) (-2.8285) (-1.1090) (2.1181) (7.5534) (-3.1493) 
^The variables in this table were not transformed. 
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°2  D3  d  F  g  SE  
- . 00026  
( - . 5742 )  
- . 00076  . 67  
( - 1 .6400 )  
2 .2466  13 .46  _a  . 000003  
»2  D3 d  F  SE  
- . 0003  
( - . 5792 )  
- . 0008  . 66  2  
(-1.6106) 
. 2530  11 .499  _a  . 000003  
*2  D3  d  F  SE  
- 36 .8121  -165 .5502  . 76  2 .2337  20 .288  _a  123150  
(-.4004) (-1.7632) 
D l  ^2  »3  d  F  0  SE  
216 .9016  -38 -257  -164 .601  . 75  2 .2405  17 ,  2670  126330  
(2.0971) (--.4104) (-1.73) 
Table 3b. Disentangled values of the coefficients of; 
Equation; Dependent Constant r -E/P r -E/P Aa (K/A)^ , D, D^ D 
variable g m t-1 1 2 3 
7.8 A(K/A) .0279 .0295 -.0126 .00004 -.0823 .0112 -.0032 -.0093 
Equation: Dependent Constant E/P r r AA (K/A) , Di D- D_ 
variable m g t-1 1 2 3 
7.9 A(K/A) .0159 -.0148 -.0122 .0293 .00003 -.088 .0107 -.003 -.0086 
Equation: Dependent Constant r -E/P r -E/P AA K D, D~ D_ 
variable g m t-1 1 2 3 
7.10 AK -2191.5 10694.3 -5162.8 15.0 -.0496 4295.8 -741.6 -3335.1 
Equation: Dependent Constant E/P r_ r AA K. ^ D D» D_ 
variable " J__ t-1 1 2 3 
7.11 AK -5745.2 -4785.3 -4895.2 10406.7 14.2 -.0535 4053.2 -714.9 -3075.8 
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All the estimated demand equations for stocks presented 
imply that stocks and government bonds are complements in 
the portfolio while stocks and mortgages are substitutes. 
The significance levels vary, however, in each equation. 
In all the equations estimated, the sign on the coefficient 
of the own rate is negative. Earnings-price ratio was used 
as the proxy of the return from stocks. 
In all the equations, the t test on the coefficient of 
r^ was positive and significantly different from zero at 
the 5 per cent level indicating that stocks and U.S. govern­
ments are complements. This could be for reasons of 
liquidity. The results imply that stocks are bought not 
for speculative purposes but as long-term investment. The 
purchase of government bonds is thus increased with any 
increase in the purchase of stocks to compensate for the 
loss in liquidity. 
All the equations suggest that mortgages and stocks 
are substitutes although none of the t tests is significant. 
However, the t scores are big enough that one would be 
reluctant to conclude that stocks and mortgages are inde­
pendent assets in the portfolio. 
Equations 7.8 and 7.9 imply a speed of adjustment of 
about 8 per cent while 7.10 and 7.11 indicate yet slower 
adjustment of only about 5 per cent of any discrepancy 
between desired and actual levels being corrected within 
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one quarter. 
The level of total assets was tried but was insignifi­
cant. However, when it was entered as a flow, change in 
assets (AA), it was significantly different from zero in 
all the estimated equations. This is not surprising. 
Stocks make up a small portion of total assets, but during 
the period covered by this study, they more than doubled 
as a per cent of the portfolio. In 1963, stocks made up 
5 per cent of total assets and continued to grow to a high 
of 11.2 per cent of the portfolio in 1972 before declining 
to 10.3 per cent in 1973 (Life Insurance Fact Book, 1974, 
p. 68). 
The major fault of the estimated equations is the 
negative sign of the own rate of return. This, however, 
may be attributable to the fact that legal restrictions on 
investments in stock by life insurance companies are quit© 
specific. They vary from state to state, but in general 
limit the proportion of the portfolio that may be held in 
stocks and usually also the type of stocks that may be held. 
Stocks have not been heavily used as a major invest­
ment medium for funds backing life insurance policies be­
cause of the contractual guarantees for specified dollar 
amounts in these policies. 
It just may be that regardless of the yield from holding 
stocks, that life insurance companies held the maximum 
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amount allowed them by law for purposes of diversification 
and as a hedge against inflation. 
The Demand for U.S. Government Bonds 
The following models were used to estimate the demand 
for U.S. government bonds: 
A(G/A) = + a2(rm-rg) + a^AA - a4(G/A)^_i 
+ otgD^ + OgDg + a^Dg (7.12) 
A(G/A) = OQ+aitr^-rg) - OgfE/P-rg) + O3AA - a,(G/A)t_i 
+ + OgDg + ayOg (7.13) 
A(G/A) = ao+a^rg - o^E/P + a^AA - a^CG/Aj^^^ 
+ agD^ + OgDg + (7.14) 
p 
A(G/A) = aQ+a^rg - ag p + G3AA - (G/A) 
+ + GgDg + (7.15) 
The results are presented in Tables 4a and 4b below: 
Table 4a. Regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for 
equations 7.12 through 7.15 
Equation 7.12; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r -r r -r AA (G/A)+. •, D, 
variable ° ^ ^ ^^ ^ 
A(G/A) .0015 .00031 -.00036 -.00000023 -.0395 -.0007 
(1.1160)(1.1299) (-.8277) (-1.6979) (-1.8147) (-3.8695) 
Equation 7.13; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r -r E/P-r AA (G/A) D 
variable ^ 
A(P/A) .0016 -.000096 -.00016 -.00000022 -.0477 -.00062 
(.0338) (-.2467) (-1.2118) (-1.6094) (-2.7884)(-3.6657) 
Equation 7.14: 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r E/P AA (G/A) D, 
variable 9 
A(G/A) .0012 .0002 -.0002 -.0000002 -.0448 -.0006 
(.0276) (.6905) (-1.1429)(-1.4465) (-1.4766) (-3.6758) 
Equation 7.15; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r P/P AA (G/A) D, 
variable ^ 
AG/A) .0004 .0002 -.0002 -.0000002 -.0459 -.0006 
(.1568) (.6891) (-.7748) (-1.1826) (-1.4842) (-3.7227) 
^The variables in this table were not transformed. 
»2 »3 d F 0 SE 
.0002 .0001 .38 2.2913 4.7723 _a .0000004 
(1.1177) (.6726) 
02 »3 d F SE 
-.0002 .00008 .38 2.3886 4.8233 _a .0000004 
(1.2336) (.5011) 
»2 °3 d F 0 SE 
.0002 .00008 .38 2.4031 4.8071 .0000004 
(1.2309) (.4717) 
»3 d F 0 SE 
.0002 .0001 -37 2.3312 4,6189 a .0000004 
(1.1919) (.7604) 
Table 4b. Disentangled values of the coefficients of; 
Equation: Dependent Constant r_-r r -r AA (G/A) , D. D D 
variable c g m g t-1 1 2 3 
7.12 AG/A) .0379 .0078 -.0092 -.000005 T-.0395 -.0172 . 0045 . 0028 
Equation: Dependent Constant r^-r E/P-r ÛA (G/A) D^ D^ 
variable 
7.13 A(G/A) .0335 -.0020 -.0033 -.000004 -.0477 -.0013 .0041 .0017 
Equation: Dependent Constant r E/P AA (G/A) D^ D^ D^ 
variable ^ 
7.14 AG/A) .0267 .0038 -.0035 -.000002 -.0448 -.0138 .0044 .0017 
Equation: Dependent Constant r P/P AA (G/A)^_j^ D^^ D^ D^ 
variable f 
7.15 A(G/A) .0087 .0038 -.0045 -.000003 -.0459 -.0139 .0042 .0028 
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The estimated equations for the demand for government 
bonds did not establish consistent significant relationships. 
The explanatory power of the presented equations is low. 
Equation 7.12 implies that government bonds and corporate 
bonds are complements, although the t test on the coeffi­
cient is not significant, but is large enough to discount 
independence of the two assets in the portfolio. This 
tends to support the result obtained in the estimated demand 
equations for corporate bonds. 
The t test on the coefficient of (r^-r^) is insignifi­
cant but has a negative sign suggesting the two assets --
mortgages and U.S. government bonds may be substitutes in 
the portfolio. This is contrary to the hypotheses and the 
significant complementary relationships found between the 
two in the equations for mortgages. 
In 7.13, the coefficient of (r^-r^) also is negative but 
this time is highly insignificant, suggesting independence 
rather than the substitute relationship implied by 7.12. 
The mortgage rate was not included in Equations 7.14 
and 7.15. 
The signs of the own rate of interest were correct 
in all the equations except in 7.13. However, the coeffi­
cients of rg in 7.14 and in 7.15,where the rates were 
entered as levels, were insignificant. 
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Equations 7.13 and 7.14 imply that government bonds 
and stocks may be substitutes. The signs of the coefficients 
of (E/P-rg) and E/P in 7.13 and 7.14 are negative. How­
ever, the t tests on these coefficients are close to but 
not quite significant at the 10 per cent level. If they 
had been significant, one could surmise that life insurance 
companies do hedge against inflation by buying stocks and 
shunning government bonds when prices in the economy are 
rising since stock yields generally move in phase with 
rising prices. 
The inflation variable f>/P was tried in Equation 
7.15. Its sign is negative as expected, but the t test is 
insignificant. 
Total assets were entered in all equations as a flow 
(change in assets). Its sign in all the equations is nega­
tive. In 7.12, the t test is significantly different from 
zero at the 5 per cent level. In Equations 7.13 and 7.14, 
significance is at the 10 per cent level. In 7.15, the 
test is close to but not significant at the 10 per cent 
level. 
The negative sign of AA implies that for the period 
estimated, government bonds were an inferior asset. Life 
insurance companies decumulated their holdings of U.S. 
government bonds over this period. 
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The speed of adjustment implied by the four equations 
is that only 4 to 5 per cent of any discrepancy between 
actual and desired levels is corrected within one quarter. 
One possible explanation of the poor performance of 
the estimated equations is that government bonds may have 
been held in the portfolio more for liquidity and risk 
hedging than for yields. They make up a very small fraction 
of the total portfolio. At year end 1973, they amounted 
to $4.3 billion or less than 2 per cent of the total port­
folio. Its size in the portfolio has decreased steeply 
since the end of World War II. In periods such as the two 
World Wars and the depression years of the 1930s, life 
insurance funds were heavily channelled into United States 
government securities. At other times, investments are 
ordinarily directed more into the private sector (Life 
Insurance Pact Book,- 1974, pp, 74-75) = At the end of 
1945, for example, U.S. governments made up an extra­
ordinary 45 per cent of the total portfolio. The continuous 
decumulation since then suggests that perhaps their primary 
function today is for portfolio balance. In other words, 
funds are taken out of U.S. governments and used to make up 
deficiencies in other assets in the portfolio as needed or 
alternatively, temporarily idle funds are put into U.S. 
government bonds instead of being held as idle money balances 
and are then liquidated as needed. 
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The Demand for State-Local Government Bonds 
The following equations were fitted for the demand by 
life insurance companies for state-local government 
bonds: 
A(S/A) = ag+a^rg + OgAA - agfS/A)^.! (7.16) 
i(S/A) = 
+ a^AA - ttg(S/A)^ ^ (7.17) 
The results are presented in Tables 5a and 5b below: 
Table 5a. Regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for Equations 7.16 and 7.17 
Equation 7.16: 
Coefficients of 
Dependent Constant r M (S/A) R d F g SE 
variable ^ ^ 
A(S/A) .00046 .0006 -.00000007 -.0497 .50 2.0570 11.506 .5025 .00000006 
(.5043) (.6301) (-1.3805) (-2.1425) 
coefficients of 
Dependent Constant r -r r -r_ r -r AA (S/A). , R^ d F g SE 
variable " g s c s t-1 
A(S/A) .0006 "=70055 .0123 .0080 -.000002 -.0376 .49 2.1783 7.6805 .5098 .00000006 
(.7933) (-1-0953) (1.2994) (1.3349) (-1.9274) (-1.5190) 
Table 5b. Disentangled values of the coefficients of; 
Equation: Dependent Constant r ÛA (S/A). 
variable ^ 
7.16 A(S/A) .0107 .0012 -.000001 -.0465 
Equation: Dependent Constant r -r r -r r -r AA (S/A). , 
variable " ^  ^ s es ^ 
7.17 A(S/A) .0159 -.0058 .0123 .0080 -.000002 -.0376 
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State and local government bonds are a very small 
fraction of the total portfolio of life insurance companies. 
They accounted for just over 1 per cent of the portfolio 
in 1973. All through the study period, the quantity of 
state and local government bonds in the portfolio was 
fairly stable, averaging $3.4 billion and ranging from 
$3.14 billion to $3.85 billion, and for all practical 
purposes could be considered constant during the study 
period. 
Only two of the attempts to estimate the demand for 
state and local government bonds were presented. 
In Equation 7.16, the own rate is the only interest rate 
variable. It has the correct sign but is insignificant. The 
change in asset, AA, has a negative coefficient and the 
t test on the coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent 
level, indicating that as a proportion of total assets, 
state and local government bonds have been declining. 
Equation 7.17, implies that mortgages and state-local 
government bonds are substitutes. However, the t test on the 
coefficient of (r^^r^) is not quite significant at the 10 
per cent level. The equation implies U.S. government bonds 
and state and local government bonds are complements — an 
unlikely result since the two classes of securities share 
very similar risks. The equation also implies complementarity 
between corporate securities and state and local government 
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bonds. It is difficult to explain why this would be so. 
Again, both classes of securities are subject to the same 
sorts of risks especially if one believes that life insurance 
companies deal mostly in high grade corporate securities where 
default risk is minimal. 
The speed of adjustment implied by both equations is 
that about 5 per cent of any adjustment is completed within 
one quarter. 
The poor performance of the estimated equations is not 
surprising given that state and local government bonds made 
up a very small fraction of the portfolio and was nearly 
constant over the sample period. 
One would suspect, in light of the insignificance of 
state and local government bonds in the portfolio, that in 
the short run the prime motivation for holding them may not 
be profit maximization so much as trying to project the image 
of a good corporate citizen by providing funds for local 
school and city projects. In the long run, such "benevolence" 
might prove profitable in helping them attract new funds. 
The estimated equations are reexamined below in terms 
of the interest-elasticity of the demand for the various 
assets. The mean elasticities are presented here. They dif­
fer from the usual definition of elasticity in that the 
means of the dependent and independent variables, and not 
their levels, are used in the calculations. 
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The results are to be interpreted in the usual manner, that 
is, a per cent change in the independent variable causes an 
n per cent change in the dependent variable. 
The elasticities presented in the tables below are long-
run elasticities, calculated from the disentangled values of 
the equations. They are presented here merely to amplify the 
results discussed above from the estimated equations. 
Table 6. The mean elasticity of A(M/A) 
With respect to: 
r^ = -14.3868 
r 
c 
42.2643 
r 
9 
28.0683 
3.6997 
10.0270 
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Table 7. The mean elasticity of A(K/A) 
With respect to: 
E/P = -5.5227 
= -5.7695 
Tg = 9.5231 
Tg-E/P = -1.2916 
Tm-E/P = -1.1901 
Table 8. The mean elasticity of A(C/A) 
With respect to; 
rg-rç, = 4.3739 
r^-rc = -1.2566 
P/P = 4.1612 
= 0.0534 
rg = -0.8723 
= -2.4365 
Table 9. The mean elasticity of A(S/A) 
With respect to: 
fm-fs = 1.6927 
^g"^s = -0.4678 
fc-fs = -1.3832 
= -0.8453 
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Table 10. The mean elasticity of A(G/A) 
With respect to: 
fm-fg 0.3580 
E/P-rg 0.1849 
= 
-1.3890 
E/P 1.4745 
P/P 0.3154 
^c"^g -0.7805 
The results should be read as follows: The mean long-
run elasticity of the change in the demand for mortgages 
A(M/A) with respect to a one percentage change in the 
mortgage yield, r^, is 14.4 per cent. 
The results show the demand for mortgages as being highly 
sensitive to the interest rate variables both as levels and 
differentials, but less so when the rates were entered as 
differentials. The same results hold for stocks. 
The demand for corporate bonds, however, is inelastic 
with respect to the rate on government bonds, r^, and its own 
rate, r^, when entered as levels, but show some sensitivity 
when these rates were entered with other rates in differential 
form. This is not surprising. The elasticities simply 
reflect the results of the estimated demand equations. The 
t tests on the coefficients of r^ and r^, as levels, were 
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insignificant. 
The elasticities of the demand for U.S. government bonds 
and state and local government bonds with respect to the 
interest rates on the various securities lends credence to 
the already discussed result that these two assets may be 
held for reasons other than short-run profitability. Accord­
ing to Tables 9 and 10, the demand for these two assets were, 
in the main, interest-inelastic. Where they showed any 
sensitivity to interest rates, the change was just over 1 
per cent. 
These results on interest elasticities of the demand for 
the various assets parallel those presented earlier and are 
merely a different way of presenting and looking at the 
same thing. 
Policy Loans 
Policy loans are life insurance company loans to their 
policyholders against the cash values of those policies. 
These loans are not determined by life insurance company 
portfolio decisions, but by the desires of policyholders to 
borrow against the accrued cash value of their policies. 
The interest rate charged on policy loan is a fixed 
contractual rate. The rate remained at 5 per cent during 
most of the period covered by this study. It changed to 6 
per cent in January 1972. For the purposes of this study. 
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however » it will be assumed that the 5 per cent rate was the 
actual rate all through the study period. It is doubtful that 
those whose policies were issued at 6 per cent since January 
1972 would have built up enough cash value against which 
to borrow. 
The low contractual rate at which policyholders could 
borrow from their life companies would make these loans very 
attractive during high interest rate periods. Individuals 
who borrow against the cash value of their policies do not 
have to repay these loans or the interest. However, the 
amount of the policyholder's protection is reduced by the 
loan and delinquent interest payment outstanding. 
Although policy loans outstanding are not determined 
by the life companies, changes in these loans are important 
since an increase in the amount outstanding decreases the 
amount the companies will have available for other higher-
yielding investments. The loans represent financial dis-
intermediation peculiar to life companies. Companies are 
forced to maintain enough cash or other highly liquid assets 
to meet the demand for these loans. If the companies under­
estimate demand for the loans, this could mean having to 
liquidate some other assets to generate the cash needed to 
meet the loan demand. 
The form of the equation that will be used to explain 
the behavior of policy loans will be the same as those 
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specified for the portfolio assets. 
The hypotheses being tested are that the stock of 
policy loans will vary directly with (a) the level of interest 
rates, (b) the level of unemployment and (c) the cash sur­
render value (CSV) of policies in force. 
The cash surrender value of policies in force es­
tablishes a ceiling on the maximum volume of policy loans 
that could be made by life companies in any period. Out­
standing policy loans may be expected to rise as this 
ceiling rises. 
Empirically, cash surrender value will be proxied by 
the difference between total assets and outstanding stock of 
policy loans at the beginning of each quarter. A better 
proxy, perhaps, would be the level of reserves less out­
standing policy loans, where reserves are total assets less 
net worth of the companies» However, the data could not be 
obtained. 
The yield on threevmonth treasury bills (r^^) and the 
yield on long-term government bonds (rg) will be used to 
represent interest rate levels. 
The behavior of policy loans is estimated for the period 
from first quarter 1963 through the third quarter 1974 
(1963-1 to 1974-III) using the following additional notations: 
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A(PL/A): change in policy loans as a proportion of total 
assets 
tb 
'g 
u 
CSV 
yield on three-month treasury bills 
yield on long-term government bonds 
unemployment rate 
cash surrender value of policies in force. 
The Demand for Policy Loans 
The following models were used to estimate the behavior 
of policy loans outstanding: 
4(PL/A) = Oj + 
+ OgDg + agDg (7.18) 
A (PL/A) = ag+a^rg^ ^ - a^fFL/Aj^-i + «3^^.-1 + 
^5^2 (7.19) 
A (PL) = ao+OiCSV^ + * ®4"t-l 
+ =S°1 + »6»2 + "7°3 (7-20) 
A (PL/A) = <»0+"lCSVt + - °3'®VA)t-L + 
^6^2 ^  ^ 7^3 (7*21) 
The results are presented in Tables 11a and lib below; 
Table lia. Regression coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for 
Equations 7.18 through 7.21 
Equation 7.18: 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r.. (PL/A). , U. , D, D. D_ 
variable ^^t-1 ^-1 t-1 1 2 3 
A(PL/A) .0004 .0007 -.0336 -.0002 .0002 .0003 -.00014 
(.4218) (5.7852) (-2.1721) (-.9316) (2.8699)(3.2209)(-1.5925) 
Equation 7.19; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant r„ (PL/A)^ _ D, D_ 
variable gfl t-1 t-1 1 2 
A(PL/A) -.0006 -.0969 -.0969 -.0003 .0002 .00015 
(-.5350) (5.3544) (-3.5870) (-1.6391) (2.0714) (1.7303) 
Equation 7.20; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant CSV r.^ PL^_, U._, D. 
variable ^ 
Apl 1229.0223 -.0113 95.5334 .0883 -93.2955 17.1597 
(2.7717) (-3.1058) (5.0576) (3.3419) (-2.9675) (.9812) 
Equation 7.21; 
Coefficient of 
Dependent Constant CSV^ r.. (PL/A)^ . U. . D. 
variable t tb^.^ t-1 t-1 1 
A(PL/A) .0008 -.00000001 .0007 -.0060 -.0002 .0003 
(.8667) (-.9662) (6.0323) (-.1907) (-1.2560) (2.8633) 
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d  F  8  SE  
.73 1.8293 18.109 ,5553 .00000012 
-2 
Dg R  d  F  p  SE 
-.00003 Tes 1.7841 14.571 .6242 .00000018 
(-.3647) 
-2 
Dg D3  R  d  F  p  SE 
25.3348 -1.3269 755 1.9837 75.72 .3107 5891.4 
(1.4194) (-0.0743) 
Dg D3  d  F  3  SE  
.0003 -.0001 .75 1.8287 18.162 .5012 .0000002 
(3.1668) (-1.6227) 
Table lib. Disentangled values of the coefficients of 
Equation Dependent Constant (PL/A). , U. , D, D_ D. 
variable *^t-l t-1 1 2 3 
7.18 A(PL/A) .0119 .0199 -.0336 -.0051 .0073 .0082 -.0042 
Equation Dependent Constant r (PL/A). u- D, D_ D 
variable t-1 1 2 3 
7.19 A(PL/A) -.0670 .0176 -.0969 -.0032 .0018 .0015 -.0003 
Equation Dependent Constant CSV. r.. PL^ , U. . D, D_ D, 
variable ^ ^^ ^  
7.20 APL^ 13918.7123 -.1279 1082.4764 .0883 -1057.119 194.4341 287.0651 -15.0346 
Equation Dependent Constant CSV r^.-. (PL/A) ^ , U _ D D D_ 
variable ^ ^*t-l ^ 2 J 
7.21 A(PL/A) .1333 -.000002 .1126 -.0060 -.0375 .0420 .0463 -.0245 
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In the equations presented above, the interest rate 
variables, both the long-term government and the 90-day 
treasury bill yields, were statistically significant. In 
all four equations, they were positive as specified and 
significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level 
using a one-tailed t-test. 
CSV was entered in Equations 7.20 and 7.21. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, its coefficient has negative signs in both 
equations and is significantly different from zero at the 
1 per cent level in 7.20 and insignificant in 7.21, The 
negative sign could mean that CSV is not a good proxy of the 
ceiling on the maximum volume of policy loans. The result 
cannot be easily explained, however, since policy loans showed 
an almost uninterrupted increase as did assets over the study 
period. One plausible explanation may be that the growth 
rate in policy loans exceeded the growth rate in total assets. 
Another surprising result is the negative sign of the 
coefficient of the unemployment variable in all four equations 
presented. The t-test on the coefficient is significant at 
the 1 per cent level in 7.20; at the 10 per cent level in 
7.19 and quite strong although not significant at the 10 per 
cent level in 7.21 and 7.18. 
One possible explanation of this result could be that 
an increase in unemployment usually affects unskilled labor 
first. This group may not have that much cash value built 
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up against which to borrow. If they did, they might be loath 
to jeopardize their future security by drawing from th*;-
poixoj.w -—t-xo^ment benefits. 
Those that are still employed when unemployment starts rising 
may see increasing unemployment as a threat to their future 
security. Instead of drawing down the value of their poli­
cies, they may tend to increase it instead while they still 
are employed and are in the position to do so. 
It could very well be that during the periods whpn un­
employment was rising, that intersrl rate levels were low or 
declining. If were the case, it seems plausible that 
IwW or declining rates would dominate the level of unemploy­
ment as an explanatory variable for the behavior of policy 
loans. It makes sense to argue that if the general interest 
decline and sopr - .. he contractual rate on policy 
leans, u^/:'''r-l'vy i -re ^kely to borrow, if they 
used to, from ' ...iMi Vr , cit • 1 ici • • especially if they 
experL ' be cut o w cfiy 
AS a |j -oporti £. r \ loans increased 
4 T 7 per cent '' -j - v. % i:î (te t 
\ . 1 O O »•. 1 I 1 i r". ^ . r 1 Q "2 3 . 
From a casua observât- x - / "4 
-hrough per fx al intervie - =• -r: 
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employment are not all that surprising. Many companies 
suffered huge drains in the form of policy loans when in­
flation and high interest rates were all t^.-; rage through 
most of 1974. Toward the end of the y and tiie beair-< ^ 
of 1975, the increase in policy ^ .ud a lowed as interest 
rates started ^o^ixaing even tV-^ugh unemployment war hitting 
Higher levels each month. 
Overall, it would fypear that the major factor de­
termining the stock of olicy loans outstanding is high 
interest rates. Since li-e insurance policies are a forz of 
savings, individuals, sophisticated in the financial maA'lcet,. 
would more than like y draw down the acc^^cu cash values af 
their policies at a relatively low interest cost wh n money 
market rates incre ;e rel^tiTs to the rates on long-term 
financial securit as. They can invest the loans in fairly 
liquid debt inst .umcnts yielding a high rata of return. When 
these instruroer is mature. they o.in pay back the loan and 
interest and ) ave some income le'-'.. Such a behavior, indeed, 
would be opt jia] for i.,di\ iduals a Peking the hic&est return 
for their £ ndk. Or'-iêirs may simply honow âqàiriôt thëir 
policies d râ- ^  /lign interest uerious 1ç-ney need cA 
borrow an ,n't ' ga. pay thô high 
^ fnigiit be individuair» .ijr to buy homes 
when mo rgage funds are scarce and mortgage, ^ ates ale high. 
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Such persons may borrow Llioxr policies for the down-
on their homes. 
Francis Schott (19 71), in a similar study, tried to ex­
plain variations in policy loans between 1965 and 1970. He 
used simple and multiple regression to analyze net policy loan 
increases at 15 leading companies which he said consistently 
accounted for about 55 per cent of the industry's total 
assets. He tested the hypotheses that (1) interest rate 
variations, (2) monetary ease or restraint, (3) credit 
availability, and (4) rising prices, were the primary 
factors influencing p' 
In terms of ro-^a^ ... . _st i 
variations were ne most ei.^ t •; na''i influence on policy 
loans. Risinr consumer price -3 - ir.t on liquidity 
growth were SJ-'" f leant wh ad availability was 
variables wsr- ferenw from those use^ % " c st •'j, 
the - ^ of r..te variations v' ' -ns was 
e by both his and ihe pre»©*^ * .>;y 
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CHAPTER VIII. IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM MONETARY 
POLICY ON LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES' PORTFOLIOS 
The issue this chapter seeks to explore is what direct 
impact, if any, monetary policy has on the portfolios of life 
insurance companies. That is, does it make any difference in 
the way life insurance companies manage their portfolios if 
the Federal Reserve System is pursuing an easy or a tight 
monetary policy. As the Fed shifts gears from monetary ease 
to tightness, or vice versa, relative rates on securities 
will be affected. This may influence the direction of flow 
of funds by life insurance companies. It can be argued, a 
priori, that an increase in interest rates resulting from a 
tight monetary policy would reduce the inflow of funds which 
the companies would have available for investments. This 
could come about in at least two ways. One is that rising 
rates would increase policy loans. The other is that rising 
rates would reduce the willingness of life companies to 
augment the inflow of investable funds by liquidating long-
term securities due to the high probability that such 
liquidation could mean capital losses. Also, there are such 
assets in the portfolio as VA and FHA-guaranteed mortgages 
with ceiling rates imposed by the government. When rising 
interest rates increase the spread between the ceiling rate 
on these government-backed mortgages and other mortgages, life 
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companies may be expected to commit less of their funds to 
the lower-yielding VA and PHA mortgages. The risk considera­
tion might be outweighed by the higher yields possible with 
the nongovernment-backed mortgages. 
One problem with the present study is that it would be 
impossible to get at the issue of whether any relative 
shifts occur from one group of mortgage holdings to another 
since all mortgage holdings by life insurance companies are 
grouped together without classification by subgroups. 
Another interesting point, which also would be im­
possible to get at, is the breakdown between short-term 
and long-term assets held by the companies during tight and 
easy money periods. During tight money periods and high 
interest rates, life companies may be expected to reduce their 
cash and bank deposits as a result of the higher yields on 
long-term securities» This effect, however, may be offset 
by net additions to holdings of short-term securities, which 
respond positively to the downward shift in the long-short 
yield differential. An increase in the holdings of shorts 
also could reflect the companies' concern with the loss of 
liquidity resulting from the decline in the market value of 
the major portion of their portfolios, which is mostly 
long-term. 
As was pointed out earlier, the securities in this 
study are considered homogeneous with respect to maturity 
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and differ only by issuer. This specification would make it 
impossible to determine any shifts in the composition of the 
portfolio between shorts and longs or government-backed 
and nongovernment-backed securities during periods of easy 
or tight money. 
For the purposes of this study, therefore, it is the 
contention that any differential effect of easy or tight money 
on the portfolio composition of life insurance companies 
will be through a change in the relative yields on competing 
assets of similar maturity structure. 
The hypothesis that will be tested is that monetary 
policy will not have any effect on portfolio management by 
life insurance companies. Due to the actuarially predictable 
nature of their obligations to their policyholders, most of 
their assets are long-term. It is thus doubtful that life 
companies would get out of longs into shorts during periods 
of rising yields. This could involve capital losses. It 
is equally doubtful that under any circumstance, say easy 
money periods, they would hold most of their assets in shorts. 
If they are already holding most of their assets in long-
term securities, a switch to shorts simply because of ease 
in monetary policy would seem out of the question. 
The problem is to come up with an acceptable definition 
and measure of monetary tightness and ease. It is not the 
purpose of this study to dabble into the issue of monetary 
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targets. Instruments and indicators.^ 
A recent study by Havrilesky et al. (1974), has de­
lineated the period covered in the present study into tight 
and easy money periods, and will be adopted for our immediate 
purposes. 
Havrilesky et al. in their study, estimated the in­
fluence of the state of the economy on the policy actions of 
the Fed in times of announced ease and tightness from July 
1962 to October 1973. They used the Federal funds rate as 
their policy-control variable or instrument. They used a 
control or policy period of just one month, justified by the 
fact that the Federal Open Market Committee, the monetary 
policy arm of the Fed, meets approximately once a month to 
determine the direction of monetary policy. Using ordinary 
least squares, they estimated; 
FF^ = ttg + 1' ^ ^t-1' BCP^_2,M) (8.1) 
where 
FF^ = federal funds rate 
U = unemployment rate 
P = wholesale price index 
^For a discussion of these topics, see Starleaf and 
Stephenson, 1969; Poole, 1970; and Havrilesky, 1972. 
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FX = exchange rate on Deutsche Mark as a barometer of 
the international position of the dollar 
BCP = bank credit proxy 
M = currency + demand deposits. 
Based on the Federal Funds rate they cataloged several 
periods into tight and easy money periods and then estimated 
the policy reactions of the Fed to the price level, the 
rate of unemployment, a measure of the country's international 
economic position and the rates of growth of "key" monetary 
aggregates. Their classification is as follows: 
Tight Money Periods Easy Money Periods 
January 1963 to December 1966 January 1967 to December 1967 
January 1968 to June 1968 July 1968 to December 1968 
January 1969 to December 1969 January 1970 to June 1971 
July 1971 to September 1972 October 1972 to December 1973 
January 1974 to September 1974^ 
Adoption of their classification of tight and easy money 
periods is not meant to endorse it as a fait accompli. One 
can seriously question their use cf the Federal funds rate 
^Their study period did not include 1974. This period 
is included as tight based on casual empiricism on the 
economy during 1974. 
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"as the single variable among all possible candidates that 
the Fed is most likely actually to have used as a control-
variable." Arguments can be made for the use instead of 
banks' free reserves or the growth rate in the money supply 
or other monetary aggregates. However, as a first "ad hoc" 
approximation of an answer to the issue of portfolio manage­
ment by life insurance companies during tight and easy money 
periods, their classification above will suffice. 
Having adopted the classification by Havrilesky et al., 
a Chow test (Chow, 1960) will be used to determine if port­
folios were managed differently in the two subperiods. 
Statistically, this amounts to testing whether the two sub­
groups of observations can be regarded as belonging to the 
same regression model. 
The mechanics of the test involves grouping all the 
data for the tight and easy money periods, respectively, 
separately. The model is estimated for each of the two sub-
periods to obtain: the residual sum of squares, (X), for the 
first subgroup with n observations, n-p degrees of freedom; 
the residual sum of squares, (Y), for the second subgroup with 
m observations and m-p degrees of freedom; and the residual 
sum of squares (Z), for the full model with n+m-p degrees of 
freedom. P is the number of explanatory variables plus an 
intercept. 
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The Chow test performs an analysis of covarianoe to 
determine if the two subgroups belong to the same regression 
model. 
The ratio (y|xI/Tnim-2p) ~ will be distributed as 
F(p, n+m-2p) under the null hypothesis that both groups be­
long to the same regression model or that there is no sig­
nificant structural change between the two subgroups. 
The 5 per cent level of significance will be used to evaluate 
the results. This means that to conclude there was a signifi­
cant structural change between the two groups of observations 
or that they don't belong to the same regression model, the 
calculated F value or the ratio A will have to be at least 
equal to the tabular F. 
The models on which the Chow test was performed are 
presented below along with the results. 
A(S/A) = a^+a^Cr^,- AA, {S/A}^ ^ ): p = 4; (n+m-2p) = 36 
A = 3.5063; F @5(4, 36) = 5.73 (8.2) 
A (S/A) = Oo+OiEfrm-rg), (rg-r^) , (r^-rg), AA, {S/A}^.^^] 
p = 6; n+m-2p = 32; A - 1.6633; 
F 05(6, 32) = 3.79 (8.3) 
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AC = OQ+(x^(r^, r^, r„, P/P, A, D^, Dj, D3) 
p = 10; n+m-2p = 24; A = 2.7171, 
F 05(10, 24) = 2.74 (8.4) 
A (C/A) = {(rg-r^), (r^j-r^), P/P, A, (C/A) 0^^,02,03} 
p = 9, n+m-2p = 26; A = 0.5901; 
F 05(9, 26) = 2.84 (8.5) 
A (G/A) = &Q+a^{rgf E/P, AA, (G/A) ,0^^,D2 
p = 8, n+m-2p = 28; A = 1.0049; 
F 0^(8, 28) = 3.09 (8.6) 
A (G/A) = ag+ai{r^^rg, E/P-rg, AA, (G/A) ^.3^,03^,02/03} 
p = 8; n+m-2p = 28; A = 0.9447; 
F 05(8' 28) = 3.09 (8.7) 
A (M/A) = aQ+ai{r^, Tg, (m/aj^.i/Di/Dg/Dg} 
p = 9, n+m-2p = 26; A = 1.5712; 
F 05(9/ 26) = 2.88 (8.8) 
Ill 
A(M/A) = (Zg-fm)' 0^,02,03} 
p = 8; n+m-2p = 28, A = 1.5996; 
F Qg(8, 28) = 3.09 (8.9) 
A(K/A) = a^+a^CE/P, AA, (k/alt.i'DifDgfDg} 
p = 9; n+m-2p = 26; A = 1.2706; 
P 05(9, 26) = 2.88 (8.10) 
A(K/A) = a^+a^C (r^-E/P) , (r^-E/P, AA. (K/A) 
p = 8; n+m-2p = 28; A = 1.3087; 
F Qg(8, 28) = 3.09 (8.11) 
A(PL/A) = (PL/A)^_^ Vl'°l'°2'°3> 
p = 7; n+m=2p = 32; A = 0^7760; 
F 05(7, 32) = 3.37 (8.12) 
MPL/A) = 0t-l'0l'»2'»3) 
p = 7; n+m-2p = 32; A = 1.0372; 
F 05(7, 32) = 3.37 (8.13) 
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A (PL/A) — (Xq+c*{CSV^, ^tb ' ^t""l''^l'^^2'^3^ 
t-1 
p = 8; n+m-2p = 30; A = 1.00; 
F 05(8, 30) = 3,08 (8.14) 
The results of the Chow test indicates there was no 
statistically significant change in structural relationships 
between tight and easy money periods in the management of 
portfolios by life insurance companies. Even at the 10 
per cent level of significance, only Equation 8.4, the 
demand for corporate bonds, had a statistically significant 
result suggesting a difference between the two subperiods. 
Based on these results, one would have to say that for 
the period covered in the study it made no difference to life 
insurance companies whether the Fed was pursuing a tight or 
easy money policy so far as portfolio management was con­
cerned. 
However, before one can conclude definitely that Fed 
policies, in general, do not affect portfolio management by 
life insurance companies, one would have to examine the 
Havrilesky et al. study more critically. Another problem 
could be the highly aggregative nature of the present study. 
It may be that the only effect Fed monetary policy has on life 
company portfolios is through a change in relative rates, 
which would change the direction and amount of committments 
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of new funds into the various assets. If life companies 
invest mostly in long-term securities, then, indeed, the 
result that there was no significant change in structural 
relationship between tight and easy money periods would not 
be questionable. However, even given that they invest 
mostly in longs, monetary policy could still influence port­
folios in certain ways. One would be that the mix between 
cash and other short-term liquid assets and long-term assets 
could change. For example, they may hold less cash, less 
treasury bills and more U.S. government bonds during tight 
money periods. Another would be that the mix between 
government-guaranteed and nongovernment-guaranteed mortgages 
could change during the two periods. 
In general, the specification that securities were of 
similar maturity structure precludes any attempt to even 
speculate on the effects of expectations about future rates 
on the direction of flow of funds, when monetary policy 
changes direction. 
Overall, however, based on the present effort, the 
conclusion is that monetary policy had no direct effect on 
portfolio management by life insurance companies. 
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CHAPTER IX. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
This study sought to depict the major determinants of 
portfolio management by life insurance companies and in a 
limited way the impact of monetary policy on the portfolios. 
The study was done within the framework of a theory 
of portfolio selection. Ordinary least squares were used 
to estimate the demand for the major assets held by life 
insurance companies. 
The results suggest that, at least for the major assets, 
changes in relative rates of returns were the major factors 
determining the flow of investment funds. 
The estimated equations for the demand of corporate 
bonds and mortgages, which together make up about 70 per 
cent of total assets, yielded consistent results. Each 
equation established the other asset as a substitute in 
the portfolio. The estimated demand equations for state-
local government bonds and United States government bonds 
however, had incorrect signs and, in general, were 
inconsistent. The result was not surprising, however, since 
the two classes of assets remained fairly constant all through 
the study period and actually declined as a proportion of 
total assets. 
Overall, the stock adjustment model used to specify the 
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demand equations appears a reasonable approximation of the 
demand for securities by life insurance companies. The 
speeds of adjustment implied by the various equations were 
very slow, indicating that only a very small fraction of any 
deficiency between actual and desired holdings of any asset 
was corrected within one quarter. 
The interest-elasticities of the demand for the 
various assets were fairly high. This result suggests that 
the capital markets can and do allocate funds into different 
investment categories in a way that would not result in any 
major distortion in one specific area of the market. For 
example, the demand for mortgages was highly sensitive to 
changes in the yields of bonds. This implies it would take 
only a slight change in the yield of bonds relative to 
mortgages to induce a flow of funds into or out of the 
corporate bond market. If the demand for mortgages, on the 
other hand, had been ineleastic with respect to the yield on 
bonds, then it would require a major change in the yield of 
bonds, relative to mortgages, to get a flow of funds into or 
out of bonds. The high interest-elasticity thus suggests 
capital market efficiency in the allocation of funds. 
Policy loans, although not determined by the life 
insurance companies themselves, represent financial dis-
intermediation peculiar to the life insurance industry. 
The volume of policy loans outstanding varies directly with 
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interest rates and adversely affects the ability of the 
companies to take advantage of higher-yielding investments 
during periods when interest rates are high or rising. 
In terms of any direct impact of monetary policy on 
portfolio management, the "tentative" result is that it 
has no effect. The word tentative is used to indicate that 
the specifications and assumptions of the present study could 
very well have masked any direct impact of monetary policy. 
It is rather difficult to say precisely how good or bad 
the results of the present study are considering the explora­
tory and apparently pioneering nature of the study. There 
are no known similar studies against which to compare the 
present results. Silber (1970) did a similar but not directly 
comparable study. For one thin$, the specification of his 
demand equations is different from that used here. For 
another, he estimated the levels of assets in the portfolio. 
It was argued in this study that the portfolio manager would 
be more concerned with investing net inflows of funds than 
with rearranging the existing or already invested portfolio. 
As a result, the focus of this study was to estimate quarterly 
changes in each asset. However, although not reported, re­
sults similar to Silber's were obtained when the levels of 
the various assets were estimated. 
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A major problem with the present study and the related 
studies cited in Chapter II would appear to be their highly 
aggregative nature. The aggregation problem encompasses 
several levels. In the first place, all life insurance 
companies were lumped together. Life insurance companies 
vary in size from the very small with assets in the millions 
of dollars to the very large with assets in the billions of 
dollars. It is conceivable that portfolio management could 
be as disparate as the number and sizes of companies in the 
industry. Management could vary from conservative to aggres­
sive. In the second place, the industry is highly regulated 
and in some cases there are as many variations in the regu­
lations as there are states. Thirdly, yields on assets were 
taken as given in the present study and some composite index 
of an average rate of return for each asset was used. This 
could be a source of problems. Within each class of assets 
and its corresponding rate of return, there could be sub­
stantial divergencies. For example, within corporate stocks 
and bonds held by life insurance companies, yields vary de­
pending on the issuing company. Fourthly, the yields were 
treated as exogenous variables and ordinary least squares were 
used to estimate the demand for the assets. This assumes that 
rates of return and the risks associated with those rates and 
expected rates are independent of the investor. This seems 
unlikely. It is more likely, given the size of life insurance 
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companies, that their combined demand or lack of demand for 
some asset will affect the price and yield of that asset. 
This suggests that perhaps a system where the rates are 
endogenously determined would be more appropriate. 
Another problem, pointed out earlier, is that there 
may exist some fairly strong but numerically immeasurable 
determinants of portfolio management such as good will and the 
need to project the image of a good corporate citizen. Such 
motives could lead to greater profitability in the long run, 
but could mean sacrificing some higher returns in the short 
run. 
All the problems discussed above are candidates for 
further research. Another important subject for further 
research would be the forward commitment process used by life 
insurance companies to extend commitments to those seeking 
mortgage and bond financing. Life insurance companies use the 
forward commitment process rather extensively. The impact 
of the determinants of portfolio management, perhaps, may be 
felt more at the commitment, instead of the acquisition stage 
of investment, if that indeed is the case, then it would be 
fruitful to obtain forecasts of future availability of funds 
and then to delineate the factors that determine how, why and 
how much of these funds are committed to the various assets. 
This would provide an opportunity to build expectation and its 
role into the model. A study of forward commitment and the 
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role of expectations in this process, would afford a better 
insight on the effect of monetary policy on portfolio 
management. Monetary policy changes may have their greatest 
impact on portfolio management by changing expectations about 
future yields and thus the direction and amount of funds 
committed to the various assets in the portfolio. 
Another suggestion would be the disaggregation of the 
topic. The result may not be generalizable, but it might be 
fruitful to find an "average" life insurance company in 
terms of the size of its assets and to study its portfolio 
management. This could give some useful insights into the 
overall portfolio management problems of the entire industry, 
especially with respect to institutional constraints and the 
nonprofit motives that help, in addition to profit considera­
tions, to determine the flow of funds into the various assets. 
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APPENDIX 
Sources of Data 
1. Data on the assets — mortgage holdings, corporate bonds, 
corporate stocks, U.S. government bonds, state-local 
government bonds and "policy loans" — were obtained from 
various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Quarter­
ly averages used in the study were created from the 
monthly series reported in the Bulletin. 
2. The interest rates used in the study also were quarterly 
averages of monthly data obtained from several issues of 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin, except where indicated 
below. 
a. U.S. Government Bond rate - the rate on long-term 
government bonds. 
b- Treasury Bill rate: the yield on three-month 
treasury bills. 
c. Corporate Bond rate: the yield on long-term 
corporate bonds prepared by Moody's investor service 
on Baa corporate bonds. 
d. Earnings-Price ratio: a measure of the returns from 
common stocks. 
Mortgage rate: the yield on conventional first 
mortgages. 
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f. State-local government bond rate: the yield on 
15 high-grade municipals (Standard and Poor's 
averages). 
g. GNP deflator: the implicit price deflator was ob­
tained from various issues of the Survey of Current 
Business and from this series the rate of inflation 
(rate of change in the GNP deflator) was created 
using the formula ——— = -=r- . 
^t ^ 
Variable Dictionary 
A = total assets 
AA = A^-A^_^ = change in level of assets 
C = corporate bonds 
G = U.S. government bonds 
S = state-local government bonds 
M = mortgages 
K = stocks 
Tg = interest rate on U.S. government bonds 
r^y = interest rate on three-month treasury bills 
Tg = interest rate on state-local government bonds 
r^ = mortgage yield 
r^ = interest rate on corporate bonds 
E/P = earnings-price ratio on common stocks 
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f*/P = rate of change in the GNP deflator 
= seasonal dummy variables, i = 1,2,3. Each 
variable takes on a value of 1 for the quarter 
represented by its subscript and is zero elsewhere. 
The dummy variables are included to account for 
any independent seasonal patterns that may exist 
in the demand for securities. 
A(PL/A) = change in policy loans as a proportion of 
total assets 
r^jj = yield on three-month treasury bills 
r^ = yield on long-term government bonds 
U = unemployment rate 
CSV = cash surrender value of policies in force 
